26、驱动调试之根据oops信息和堆栈确定出错的代码
a.驱动作为模块：
1. 根据pc值确定该指令属于内核还是外加的模块
pc=0xbf000018 它属于什么的地址？是内核还是通过insmod加载的驱动程序？
先判断是否属于内核的地址: 看System.map确定内核的函数的地址范围:c0004000~c03265a4
<System.map文件在内核make uImage后产生，在内核顶层目录下>
如果不属于System.map里的范围，则它属于insmod加载的驱动程序
2. 假设它是加载的驱动程序引入的错误，怎么确定是哪一个驱动程序？
先看看加载的驱动程序的函数的地址范围
cat /proc/kallsyms > /kallsyms.txt (内核函数、加载的函数的地址)
从这些信息里找到一个相近的地址, 这个地址<=0xbf000018
比如找到了：
bf000000 t first_drv_open [first_drv]
3. 找到了first_drv.ko
在PC上反汇编它: arm-linux-objdump -D first_drv.ko > frist_drv.dis
在dis文件里找到first_drv_open
first_drv.dis文件里 insmod后
00000000 <first_drv_open> : bf000000 t first_drv_open [first_drv]
00000018 pc = bf000018
(18: ldr r3, [r2] 将r2地址的值给r3，根据oops信息找到出错时r2的值，根据发送错误时的打印信息查看r2的值)
./firstdrvtest on
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 56000050
内核使用56000050来访问时发生了错误
pgd = c3eb0000
[56000050] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1]
Modules linked in: first_drv
CPU: 0 Not tainted (2.6.22.6 #1)
PC is at first_drv_open+0x18(该指令的偏移)/0x3c(该函数的总大小) [first_drv]
PC就是发生错误的指令的地址
大多时候，PC值只会给出一个地址，不到指示说是在哪个函数里
LR is at chrdev_open+0x14c/0x164
LR寄存器的值
pc = 0xbf000018
pc : [<bf000018>] lr : [<c008d888>] psr: a0000013
sp : c3c7be88 ip : c3c7be98 fp : c3c7be94
r10: 00000000 r9 : c3c7a000 r8 : c049abc0
r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00000000 r5 : c3e740c0 r4 : c06d41e0
r3 : bf000000 r2 : 56000050 r1 : bf000964 r0 : 00000000
执行这条导致错误的指令时各个寄存器的值
Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 Segment user
Control: c000717f Table: 33eb0000 DAC: 00000015
Process firstdrvtest (pid: 777, stack limit = 0xc3c7a258)
发生错误时当前进程的名称是firstdrvtest
栈
Stack: (0xc3c7be88 to 0xc3c7c000)
be80: c3c7bebc c3c7be98 c008d888 bf000010 00000000 c049abc0
bea0: c3e740c0 c008d73c c0474e20 c3e766a8 c3c7bee4 c3c7bec0 c0089e48 c008d74c
bec0: c049abc0 c3c7bf04 00000003 ffffff9c c002c044 c3d10000 c3c7befc c3c7bee8
bee0: c0089f64 c0089d58 00000000 00000002 c3c7bf68 c3c7bf00 c0089fb8 c0089f40
bf00: c3c7bf04 c3e766a8 c0474e20 00000000 00000000 c3eb1000 00000101 00000001
bf20: 00000000 c3c7a000 c04a7468 c04a7460 ffffffe8 c3d10000 c3c7bf68 c3c7bf48
bf40: c008a16c c009fc70 00000003 00000000 c049abc0 00000002 bec1fee0 c3c7bf94
bf60: c3c7bf6c c008a2f4 c0089f88 00008520 bec1fed4 0000860c 00008670 00000005
bf80: c002c044 4013365c c3c7bfa4 c3c7bf98 c008a3a8 c008a2b0 00000000 c3c7bfa8
bfa0: c002bea0 c008a394 bec1fed4 0000860c 00008720 00000002 bec1fee0 00000001
bfc0: bec1fed4 0000860c 00008670 00000002 00008520 00000000 4013365c bec1fea8
bfe0: 00000000 bec1fe84 0000266c 400c98e0 60000010 00008720 00000000 00000000
Backtrace: (回溯)(需要make menuconfig配置内核支持回溯
kernel hacking
<*> kernel debugging
)
（回溯的原理是在执行函数的时候把sp指针赋给fp寄存器，段错误时根据fp来回溯，可以看汇编代码，主要根据sp保存的lr来一步步回推，lr是调用者的地址）
[<bf000000>] (first_drv_open+0x0/0x3c [first_drv]) from [<c008d888>] (chrdev_open+0x14c/0x164)
[<c008d73c>] (chrdev_open+0x0/0x164) from [<c0089e48>] (__dentry_open+0x100/0x1e8)
r8:c3e766a8 r7:c0474e20 r6:c008d73c r5:c3e740c0 r4:c049abc0
[<c0089d48>] (__dentry_open+0x0/0x1e8) from [<c0089f64>] (nameidata_to_filp+0x34/0x48)
[<c0089f30>] (nameidata_to_filp+0x0/0x48) from [<c0089fb8>] (do_filp_open+0x40/0x48)
r4:00000002
[<c0089f78>] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x48) from [<c008a2f4>] (do_sys_open+0x54/0xe4)
r5:bec1fee0 r4:00000002
[<c008a2a0>] (do_sys_open+0x0/0xe4) from [<c008a3a8>] (sys_open+0x24/0x28)
[<c008a384>] (sys_open+0x0/0x28) from [<c002bea0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x2c)
Code: e24cb004 e59f1024 e3a00000 e5912000 (e5923000)
Segmentation fault
#
b. 编入内核
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 Not tainted (2.6.22.6 #2)
PC is at first_drv_open+0x18/0x3c
LR is at chrdev_open+0x14c/0x164
pc : [<c014e6c0>] lr : [<c008638c>] psr: a0000013
sp : c3a03e88 ip : c3a03e98 fp : c3a03e94
r10: 00000000 r9 : c3a02000 r8 : c03f3c60
r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00000000 r5 : c38a0c50 r4 : c3c1e780
r3 : c014e6a8 r2 : 56000050 r1 : c031a47c r0 : 00000000
Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 Segment user
Control: c000717f Table: 339f0000 DAC: 00000015
Process firstdrvtest (pid: 750, stack limit = 0xc3a02258)
1. 根据pc值确定该指令属于内核还是外加的模块
pc=c014e6c0 属于内核(看System.map)
2. 反汇编内核: arm-linux-objdump -D vmlinux > vmlinux.dis
在dis文件里搜c014e6c0
c014e6a8 <first_drv_open>:
c014e6a8: e1a0c00d mov ip, sp
c014e6ac: e92dd800 stmdb sp!, {fp, ip, lr, pc}
c014e6b0: e24cb004 sub fp, ip, #4 ; 0x4
c014e6b4: e59f1024 ldr r1, [pc, #36] ; c014e6e0 <.text+0x1276e0>
c014e6b8: e3a00000 mov r0, #0 ; 0x0
c014e6bc: e5912000 ldr r2, [r1]
c014e6c0: e5923000 ldr r3, [r2] // 在此出错 r2=56000050
3. 根据栈信息分析函数调用过程
# ./firstdrvtest on
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 56000050
pgd = c3e78000
[56000050] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1]
Modules linked in: first_drv
CPU: 0 Not tainted (2.6.22.6 #48)
PC is at first_drv_open+0x18/0x3c [first_drv]
LR is at chrdev_open+0x14c/0x164
pc : [<bf000018>] lr : [<c008c888>] psr: a0000013
3.1 根据PC确定出错位置
bf000018 属于 insmod的模块
bf000000 t first_drv_open [first_drv]
3.2 确定它属于哪个函数
反汇编first_drv.ko
通过查看反汇编代码可以看到进入first_drv_open 函数后执行stmdb sp！，{fp,ip,lr,pc}保存了四个寄存器信息，fp就是r15，lr就是r14，ip就是r12，fp就是r11，SP制作是往低位地址移动，高位先保存pc，接着lr、ip、fp，每个寄存器32位，lr就是返回地址即调用函数的地址。
举例：下面打印的栈信息中第一个栈的lr是c008c888 ,根据前面分析可以得到是内核地址，查看反汇编确认调用函数，分析调用函数来确认其占用了多大的栈，在栈信息中，first_drv_open 栈用4*4字节的栈，后面就是调用者的栈，根据前面确认其栈大小，重复前面的步骤
sp : c3e69e88 ip : c3e69e98 fp : c3e69e94
r10: 00000000 r9 : c3e68000 r8 : c0490620
r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00000000 r5 : c3e320a0 r4 : c06a8300
r3 : bf000000 r2 : 56000050 r1 : bf000964 r0 : 00000000
Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 Segment user
Control: c000717f Table: 33e78000 DAC: 00000015
Process firstdrvtest (pid: 752, stack limit = 0xc3e68258)
Stack: (0xc3e69e88 to 0xc3e6a000)
9e80: c3e69ebc c3e69e98 c008c888 bf000010 00000000 c0490620
first_drv_open'sp lr chrdev_open'sp
9ea0: c3e320a0 c008c73c c0465e20 c3e36cb4 c3e69ee4 c3e69ec0 c0088e48 c008c74c
lr
9ec0: c0490620 c3e69f04 00000003 ffffff9c c002b044 c06e0000 c3e69efc c3e69ee8
__dentry_open'sp
9ee0: c0088f64 c0088d58 00000000 00000002 c3e69f68 c3e69f00 c0088fb8 c0088f40
lr nameidata_to_filp'sp lr
9f00: c3e69f04 c3e36cb4 c0465e20 00000000 00000000 c3e79000 00000101 00000001
do_filp_open'sp
9f20: 00000000 c3e68000 c04c1468 c04c1460 ffffffe8 c06e0000 c3e69f68 c3e69f48
9f40: c008916c c009ec70 00000003 00000000 c0490620 00000002 be94eee0 c3e69f94
9f60: c3e69f6c c00892f4 c0088f88 00008520 be94eed4 0000860c 00008670 00000005
lr do_sys_open'sp
9f80: c002b044 4013365c c3e69fa4 c3e69f98 c00893a8 c00892b0 00000000 c3e69fa8
lr sys_open'sp
9fa0: c002aea0 c0089394 be94eed4 0000860c 00008720 00000002 be94eee0 00000001
lr ret_fast_syscall'sp
9fc0: be94eed4 0000860c 00008670 00000002 00008520 00000000 4013365c be94eea8
9fe0: 00000000 be94ee84 0000266c 400c98e0 60000010 00008720 00000000 00000000
