使用volatility——扫描互斥体和隐藏服务,隐藏服务本质上和隐藏进程一样
隐藏服务本质上和隐藏进程没有区别!
svcscan原理:
因此,要找到隐藏的服务就需要使用svcscan,同时结合sc query看到的可见服务进行对比,以发现隐藏服务!
1 2 3 | PS D:\Application\volatility3-stable\moddmp_out> volatility26.exe -f "D:\book\malwarecookbook-master\malwarecookbook-master\17\6\be2.vmem\be2.vmem" svcscan >service.result.txt Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6 PS D:\Application\volatility3-stable\moddmp_out> notepad.exe .\service.result.txt |
结果类似:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 | Offset: 0x6e1e90 Order: 1 Start: SERVICE_DISABLED Process ID: - Service Name: Abiosdsk Display Name: Abiosdsk Service Type: SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER Service State: SERVICE_STOPPED Binary Path: - Offset: 0x6e1f20 Order: 2 Start: SERVICE_DISABLED Process ID: - Service Name: abp480n5 Display Name: abp480n5 Service Type: SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER Service State: SERVICE_STOPPED Binary Path: - Offset: 0x6e1fb0 Order: 3 Start: SERVICE_BOOT_START Process ID: - Service Name: ACPI Display Name: Microsoft ACPI Driver Service Type: SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER Service State: SERVICE_RUNNING Binary Path: \Driver\ACPI |
最后,补充下互斥体扫描(注意仅仅是扫描,是否恶意还要进一步判断)使用:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 | PS D:\Application\volatility3-stable\moddmp_out> volatility26 -f D:\book\malwarecookbook-master\malwarecookbook-master\17\1\zeus.vmem\zeus.vmem mutantscan -s Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6 Offset(P) #Ptr #Hnd Signal Thread CID Name ------------------ -------- -------- ------ ---------- --------- ---- 0x00000000000962c0 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x00000000007c0840 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x00000000009d86e0 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x00000000009d90d8 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x0000000000eda878 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x0000000000edae88 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x000000000105a278 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x000000000105a2e8 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x000000000105aa38 7 6 1 0x00000000 _!MSFTHISTORY!_ 0x000000000105acf0 2 1 0 0xff3ba880 888:912 wscntfy_mtx 0x000000000105e900 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x0000000001061fe0 2 1 1 0x00000000 542B5ABE01CB391B000003A82 0x00000000010633b8 2 1 1 0x00000000 msgina: InteractiveLogonRequestMutex 0x0000000001066480 2 1 1 0x00000000 PerfOS_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_684 0x00000000010669d0 2 1 1 0x00000000 winlogon: Logon UserProfileMapping Mutex 0x0000000001066bd0 2 1 1 0x00000000 PerfProc_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_684 0x00000000010676d8 2 1 1 0x00000000 RemoteAccess_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_684 0x0000000001067d60 1 1 1 0x00000000 0x0000000001069fa8 2 1 1 0x00000000 WmiApRpl_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_684 0x000000000106fb60 3 2 1 0x00000000 WininetProxyRegistryMutex 0x0000000001070380 2 1 1 0x00000000 Spooler_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_684 0x00000000010719b0 2 1 1 0x00000000 ContentFilter_Perf_Library_Lock_PID_684 0x0000000001071e40 1 1 1 0x00000000 |
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