any run 开源在线沙箱 真的是很好用啊!!!以后自己分析特定恶意文件就可以用他了!!!进程、注册表、com组件api调用行为、计划任务等都可以看到,并且还有att&ck的矩阵
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如果你要看某样本分析报告:直接在any run里去搜索hash好了!!!
然后就可以看沙箱的详细报告。
我们再看下,jossandbox也是非常好用啊。
在result界面搜hash即可。
回到any run。
比如,我分析wannacry后,看att&ck攻击图:比如我想看,持久化里面的部分,点击scheduled task:
然后,可以看到,wbengine.exe调用了一个com api实现了定时任务,然后到进程页面看看:
的确就是他干的!看下more info:
看进程图里这个进程是如何启动的:
前面SER表示,是以服务的方式启动的。。。
然后下面这个图是说调用了com api,加入计划任务?没看太懂。。。计划任务不是有执行周期啥的嘛,这个没有。。。?
我们在看看text report也是非常友好的:
比如,行为分析部分就很详细:
Behavior activities
下面是可疑的行为 最右边是其他info辅助消息 这些都是确定恶意的 Application was injected by another process(是说进程注入) - svchost.exe (PID: 548)
- svchost.exe (PID: 924)
- SearchIndexer.exe (PID: 2796)
- svchost.exe (PID: 3884)
- wmiprvse.exe (PID: 3700)
- SearchIndexer.exe (PID: 2796)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 2468)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3884)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2964)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2468)
- taskhsvc.exe (PID: 1548)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 4092)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 612)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2508)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 1388)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3188)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 648)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3036)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2524)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2072)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 1200)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2316)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3452)
- SearchProtocolHost.exe (PID: 120)
- taskhsvc.exe (PID: 1548)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- cmd.exe (PID: 4064)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- cmd.exe (PID: 2968)
- cmd.exe (PID: 2968)
- wbadmin.exe (PID: 1688)
- wbengine.exe (PID: 1524)
- reg.exe (PID: 2820)
Checks supported languages - WinRAR.exe (PID: 872)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- cmd.exe (PID: 1292)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 2468)
- cscript.exe (PID: 2204)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3884)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2964)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2468)
- cmd.exe (PID: 4064)
- taskhsvc.exe (PID: 1548)
- cmd.exe (PID: 2968)
- wmiprvse.exe (PID: 3700)
- WMIC.exe (PID: 3396)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 4092)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 612)
- cmd.exe (PID: 3696)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 1200)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3036)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2508)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3188)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2316)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 648)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 1388)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2524)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2072)
- taskdl.exe (PID: 3452)
- WinRAR.exe (PID: 872)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- cscript.exe (PID: 2204)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2468)
- taskhsvc.exe (PID: 1548)
- WMIC.exe (PID: 3396)
- wmiprvse.exe (PID: 3700)
- SearchIndexer.exe (PID: 2796)
- WinRAR.exe (PID: 872)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2964)
- SearchIndexer.exe (PID: 2796)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2964)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2468)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- taskhsvc.exe (PID: 1548)
- cmd.exe (PID: 1292)
- @WanaDecryptor@.exe (PID: 2964)
- vssvc.exe (PID: 3932)
- wbengine.exe (PID: 1524)
- vds.exe (PID: 2324)
- wbadmin.exe (PID: 1688)
- vdsldr.exe (PID: 2792)
- cmd.exe (PID: 3696)
Reads the computer name - SearchProtocolHost.exe (PID: 120)
- icacls.exe (PID: 3684)
- vssadmin.exe (PID: 3936)
- vssvc.exe (PID: 3932)
- svchost.exe (PID: 3884)
- wbadmin.exe (PID: 1688)
- vds.exe (PID: 2324)
- wbengine.exe (PID: 1524)
- vdsldr.exe (PID: 2792)
- SearchProtocolHost.exe (PID: 120)
- attrib.exe (PID: 3536)
- icacls.exe (PID: 3684)
- vssvc.exe (PID: 3932)
- svchost.exe (PID: 3884)
- vssadmin.exe (PID: 3936)
- bcdedit.exe (PID: 3044)
- bcdedit.exe (PID: 672)
- wbadmin.exe (PID: 1688)
- wbengine.exe (PID: 1524)
- vds.exe (PID: 2324)
- vdsldr.exe (PID: 2792)
- reg.exe (PID: 2820)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- Proforma Invoice and Bank swift-REG.PI-0086547654.exe (PID: 2680)
- taskhsvc.exe (PID: 1548)
- cscript.exe (PID: 2204)
还可以看到注册表修改事件:
2820 reg.exe write HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run yyibsxxiapw107 "C:\Users\admin\Desktop\tasksche.exe"特么在开机启动啊。。。当然作为勒索还有大量的删除文件动作:当然,做网络流量分析的话,还可以看看网络流量相关请求:
总之,这玩意对我们检测来说真的是太好用了!!!
[翻译]我如何使用app.any.run https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-254296.htm2019-9-5 15:52
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