转：一个数学家的辩白--哈代

A Mathematician’s Apology

G. H. Hardy

First Published November 1940

As fifty or more years have passed since
the death of the author, this book is now
in the public domain in the Dominion of
Canada.

First Electronic Edition, Version 1.0
March 2005

Published by the
University of Alberta Mathematical Sciences Society

Available on the World Wide Web at
http://www.math.ualberta.ca/mss/

To
JOHN LOMAS
who asked me to write it

Preface

I am indebted for many valuable criticisms to Professor C. D.
Broad and Dr C. P. Snow, each of whom read my original
manuscript. I have incorporated the substance of nearly all of
their suggestions in my text, and have so removed a good many
crudities and obscurities.

In one case, I have dealt with them differently. My §28 is
based on a short article which I contributed to Eureka (the journal
of the Cambridge Archimedean Society) early in the year, and I
found it impossible to remodel what I had written so recently and
with so much care. Also, if I had tried to meet such important
criticisms seriously, I should have had to expand this section so
much as to destroy the whole balance of my essay. I have
therefore left it unaltered, but have added a short statement of the
chief points made by my critics in a note at the end.

G. H. H.
18
July
1940

It is a melancholy experience for a professional mathematician to
find himself writing about mathematics. The function of a
mathematician is to do something, to prove new theorems, to add
to mathematics, and not to talk about what he or other mathematicians
have done. Statesmen despise publicists, painters despise
art-critics, and physiologists, physicists, or mathematicians have
usually similar feelings: there is no scorn more profound, or on
the whole more justifiable, than that of the men who make for the
men who explain. Exposition, criticism, appreciation, is work for
second-rate minds.

I can remember arguing this point once in one of the few
serious conversations that I ever had with Housman. Housman, in
his Leslie Stephen lecture The Name and Nature of Poetry, had
denied very emphatically that he was a ‘critic’; but he had denied
it in what seemed to me a singularly perverse way, and had
expressed an admiration for literary criticism which startled and
scandalized me.

He had begun with a quotation from his inaugural lecture,
delivered twenty-two years before—

Whether the faculty of literary criticism is the best
gift that Heaven has in its treasures, I cannot say; but
Heaven seems to think so, for assuredly it is the gift
most charily bestowed. Orators and poets…, if rare in
comparison with blackberries, are commoner than returns
of Halley's comet: literary critics are less common…

And he had continued—

In these twenty-two years I have improved in some
respects and deteriorated in others, but I have not so
much improved as to become a literary critic, nor so
much deteriorated as to fancy that I have become one.

It had seemed to me deplorable that a great scholar and a fine
poet should write like this, and, finding myself next to him in
Hall a few weeks later, I plunged in and said so. Did he really
mean what he had said to be taken very seriously? Would the life
of the best of critics really have seemed to him comparable with
that of a scholar and a poet? We argued the questions all through
dinner, and I think that finally he agreed with me. I must not seem
to claim a dialectical triumph over a man who can no longer
contradict me, but ‘Perhaps not entirely’ was, in the end, his reply
to the first question, and ‘Probably no’ to the second.

There may have been some doubt about Housman's feelings,
and I do not wish to claim him as on my side; but there is no
doubt at all about the feelings of men of science, and I share them
fully. If then I find myself writing, not mathematics, but ‘about’
mathematics, it is a confession of weakness, for which I may
rightly be scorned or pitied by younger and more vigorous
mathematicians. I write about mathematics because, like any
other mathematician who has passed sixty, I have no longer the
freshness of mind, the energy, or the patience to carry on
effectively with my proper job.

I propose to put forward an apology for mathematics; and I may
be told that it needs none, since there are now few studies more
generally recognized, for good reasons or bad, as profitable and
praiseworthy. This may be true: indeed it is probable, since the
sensational triumphs of Einstein, that stellar astronomy and
atomic physics are the only sciences which stand higher in
popular estimation. A mathematician need not now consider
himself on the defensive. He does not have to meet the sort of
opposition describe by Bradley in the admirable defence of
metaphysics which forms the introduction to Appearance and
Reality.

A metaphysician, says Bradley, will be told that ‘metaphysical
knowledge is wholly impossible’, or that ‘even if possible to a
certain degree, it is practically no knowledge worth the name’.
‘The same problems,’ he will hear, ‘the same disputes, the same
sheer failure. Why not abandon it and come out? Is there nothing
else worth your labour?’ There is no one so stupid as to use this
sort of language about mathematics. The mass of mathematical
truth is obvious and imposing; its practical applications, the
bridges and steam-engines and dynamos, obtrude themselves on
the dullest imagination. The public does not need to be convinced
that there is something in mathematics.

All this is in its way very comforting to mathematicians, but it
is hardly possible for a genuine mathematician to be content with
it. Any genuine mathematician must feel that it is not on these
crude achievements that the real case for mathematics rests, that
the popular reputation of mathematics is based largely on
ignorance and confusion, and there is room for a more rational
defence. At any rate, I am disposed to try to make one. It should
be a simpler task than Bradley’s difficult apology.

I shall ask, then, why is it really worth while to make a serious
study of mathematics? What is the proper justification of a
mathematician’s life? And my answers will be, for the most part,
such as are expected from a mathematician: I think that it is worth
while, that there is ample justification. But I should say at once
that my defence of mathematics will be a defence of myself, and
that my apology is bound to be to some extent egotistical. I
should not think it worth while to apologize for my subject if I
regarded myself as one of its failures.

Some egotism of this sort is inevitable, and I do not feel that it
really needs justification. Good work is no done by ‘humble’
men. It is one of the first duties of a professor, for example, in
any subject, to exaggerate a little both the importance of his
subject and his own importance in it. A man who is always asking
‘Is what I do worth while?’ and ‘Am I the right person to do it?’

will always be ineffective himself and a discouragement to
others. He must shut his eyes a little and think a little more of his
subject and himself than they deserve. This is not too difficult: it
is harder not to make his subject and himself ridiculous by
shutting his eyes too tightly.

A man who sets out to justify his existence and his activities has
to distinguish two different questions. The first is whether the
work which he does is worth doing; and the second is why he
does it, whatever its value may be. The first question is often very
difficult, and the answer very discouraging, but most people will
find the second easy enough even then. Their answers, if they are
honest, will usually take one or other of two forms; and the
second form is a merely a humbler variation of the first, which is
the only answer we need consider seriously.

(1) ‘I do what I do because it is the one and only thing that I
can do at all well. I am a lawyer, or a stockbroker, or a professional
cricketer, because I have some real talent for that particular
job. I am a lawyer because I have a fluent tongue, and am
interested in legal subtleties; I am a stockbroker because my
judgment of the markets is quick and sound; I am a professional
cricketer because I can bat unusually well. I agree that it might be
better to be a poet or a mathematician, but unfortunately I have no
talent for such pursuits.’
I am not suggesting that this is a defence which can be made
by most people, since most people can do nothing at all well. But
it is impregnable when it can be made without absurdity, as it can
by a substantial minority: perhaps five or even ten percent of men
can do something rather well. It is a tiny minority who can do
something really well, and the number of men who can do two
things well is negligible. If a man has any genuine talent he

should be ready to make almost any sacrifice in order to cultivate
it to the full.

This view was endorsed by Dr Johnson

When I told him that I had been to see [his name

sake] Johnson ride upon three horses, he said ‘Such a

man, sir, should be encouraged, for his performances

show the extent of the human powers ...’—
and similarly he would have applauded mountain climbers,
channel swimmers, and blindfold chess-players. For my own part,
I am entirely in sympathy with all such attempts at remarkable
achievement. I feel some sympathy even with conjurors and
ventriloquists and when Alekhine and Bradman set out to beat
records, I am quite bitterly disappointed if they fail. And here
both Dr Johnson and I find ourselves in agreement with the
public. As W. J. Turner has said so truly, it is only the
‘highbrows’ (in the unpleasant sense) who do not admire the ‘real
swells’.

We have of course to take account of the differences in value
between different activities. I would rather be a novelist or a
painter than a statesman of similar rank; and there are many roads
to fame which most of us would reject as actively pernicious. Yet
it is seldom that such differences of value will turn the scale in a
man’s choice of a career, which will almost always be dictated by
the limitations of his natural abilities. Poetry is more valuable
than cricket, but Bradman would be a fool if he sacrificed his
cricket in order to write second-rate minor poetry (and I suppose
that it is unlikely that he could do better). If the cricket were a
little less supreme, and the poetry better, then the choice might be
more difficult: I do not know whether I would rather have been
Victor Trumper or Rupert Brooke. It is fortunate that such
dilemmas are so seldom.

I may add that they are particularly unlikely to present themselves
to a mathematician. It is usual to exaggerate rather grossly
the differences between the mental processes of mathematicians

and other people, but it is undeniable that a gift for mathematics
is one of the most specialized talents, and that mathematicians as
a class are not particularly distinguished for general ability or
versatility. If a man is in any sense a real mathematician, then it is
a hundred to one that his mathematics will be far better than
anything else he can do, and that he would be silly if he surrendered
any decent opportunity of exercising his one talent in order
to do undistinguished work in other fields. Such a sacrifice could
be justified only by economic necessity or age.

I had better say something here about this question of age, since it
is particularly important for mathematicians. No mathematician
should ever allow himself to forget that mathematics, more than
any other art or science, is a young man's game. To take a simple
illustration at a comparatively humble level, the average age of
election to the Royal Society is lowest in mathematics. We can
naturally find much more striking illustrations. We may consider,
for example, the career of a man who was certainly one of the
world's three greatest mathematicians. Newton gave up mathematics
at fifty, and had lost his enthusiasm long before; he had
recognized no doubt by the time he was forty that his greatest
creative days were over. His greatest idea of all, fluxions and the
law of gravitation, came to him about 1666, when he was twentyfour—'
in those days I was in the prime of my age for invention,
and minded mathematics and philosophy more than at any time
sine'. He made big discoveries until he was nearly forty (the
'elliptic orbit' at thirty-seven), but after that he did little but polish
and perfect.

Galois died at twenty-one, Abel at twenty-seven, Ramanujan at
thirty-three, Riemann at forty. There have been men who have
done great work a good deal later; Gauss's great memoir on
differential geometry was published when he was fifty (though he

had had the fundamental ideas ten years before). I do not know an
instance of a major mathematical advance initiated by a man past
fifty. If a man of mature age loses interest in and abandons
mathematics, the loss is not likely to be very serious either for
mathematics or for himself.

On the other hand the gain is no more likely to be substantial:
the later records of mathematicians are not particularly encouraging.
Newton made a quite competent Master of the Mint (when
he was not quarrelling with anybody). Painlevé was a not very
successful Premier of France. Laplace’s political career was
highly discreditable, but he is hardly a fair instance since he was
dishonest rather than incompetent, and never really ‘gave up’
mathematics. It is very hard to find an instance of a first-rate
mathematician who has abandoned mathematics and attained
first-rate distinction in any other field.1 There may have been
young men who would have been first-rate mathematician if they
had stuck in mathematics, but I have never heard of a really
plausible example. And all this is fully borne out by my very own
limited experience. Every young mathematician of real talent
whom I have known has been faithful to mathematics, and not
form lack of ambition but from abundance of it; they have all
recognized that there, if anywhere, lay the road to a life of any
distinction.

There is also what I call the ‘humbler variation’ of the standard
apology; but I may dismiss this in a very few words.

(2) ‘There is nothing that I can do particularly well. I do what I
do because it came my way. I really never had a chance of doing
anything else.’ And this apology too I accept as conclusive. It is
quite true that most people can do nothing well. If so, it matters
very little what career they choose, and there is really nothing
1 Pascal seems the best

more to say about it. It is a conclusive reply, but hardly one likely
to be made by a man with any pride; and I may assume that none
of us would be content with it.

It is time to begin thinking about the first question which I put in
§3, and which is so much more difficult than the second. Is
mathematics, what I and other mathematicians mean by mathematics,
worth doing; and if so, why?

I have been looking again at the first pages of the inaugural
lecture which I gave at Oxford in 1920, where there is an outline
of an apology for mathematics. It is very inadequate (less than a
couple of page), and is written in a style (a first essay, I suppose,
in what I then imagined to be the ‘Oxford manner’) of which I am
not now particularly proud; but I still feel that, however much
development it may need, it contains the essentials of the matter. I
will resume what I said then, as a preface to a fuller discussion.

(1) I began by laying stress on the harmlessness of mathematics—‘
the study of mathematics is, if an unprofitable, a perfectly
harmless and innocent occupation’. I shall stick to that, but
obviously it will need a good deal of expansion and explanation.
Is mathematics ‘unprofitable’? In some ways, plainly, it is not;
for example, it gives great pleasure to quite a large number of
people. I was thinking of ‘profit’, however, in a narrower sense.
Is mathematics ‘useful’, directly useful, as other sciences such as
chemistry and physiology are? This is not an altogether easy or
uncontroversial question, and I shall ultimately say No, though
some mathematicians, and some outsiders, would no doubt say
Yes. And is mathematics ‘harmless’? Again the answer is not
obvious, and the question is one which I should have in some
ways preferred to avoid, since it raises the whole problem of the
effect of science on war. Is mathematics harmless, in the sense in

which, for example, chemistry plainly is not? I shall have to come
back to both these questions later.

(2) I went on to say that ‘the scale of the universe is large and,
if we are wasting our time, the waste of the lives of a few
university dons is no such overwhelming catastrophe’; and here I
may seem to be adopting, or affecting, the pose of exaggerated
humility which I repudiated a moment ago. I am sure that that
was not what was really in my mind: I was trying to say in a
sentence that which I have said at much greater length in §3. I
was assuming that we dons really had our little talents, and that
we could hardly be wrong if we did our best to cultivate them
further.
(3) Finally (in what seem to me now some rather painfully
rhetorical sentences) I emphasized the permanence of mathematical
achievement—
What we do may be small, but it has a certain character
of permanence; and to have produced anything of
the slightest permanent interest, whether it be a copy of
verses or a geometrical theorem, is to have done something
utterly beyond the powers of the vast majority of
men.

And—
In these days of conflict between ancient and modern
studies, there must surely be something to be said for a
study which did not begin with Pythagoras, and will
not end with Einstein, but is the oldest and the youngest
of all.

All this is ‘rhetoric’; but the substance of it seems to me still to
ring true, and I can expand on it at once without prejudicing any
of the other questions which I am leaving open.

I shall assume that I am writing for readers who are full, or have
in the past been full, of a proper spirit of ambition. A man’s first
duty, a young man’s at any rate, is to be ambitious. Ambition is a
noble passion which may legitimately take many forms; there was
something noble in the ambitions of Attila or Napoleon; but the
noblest ambition is that of leaving behind something of permanent
value—

Here, on the level sand,

Between the sea and land,

What shall I build or write

Against the fall of night?

Tell me of runes to grave

That hold the bursting wave,

Or bastions to design,

For longer date than mine.

Ambition has been the driving force behind nearly all the best
work of the world. In particular, practically all substantial
contributions to human happiness have been made by ambitious
men. To take two famous examples, were not Lister and Pasteur
ambitions? Or, on a humbler level, King Gillette and William
Willet; and who in recent times have contributed more to human
comfort than they?

Physiology provides particularly good examples, just because
it is so obviously a ‘beneficial’ study. We must guard against a
fallacy common among apologist of science, the fallacy of
supposing that the men whose work most benefits humanity are
thinking much of that while they do it, that physiologists, for
example, have particularly noble souls. A physiologist may
indeed be glad to remember that his work will benefit mankind,
but the motives which provide the force and the inspiration for it

are indistinguishable form those of a classical scholar or a
mathematician.

There are many highly respected motives which may lead men
to prosecute research, but three which are much more important
than the rest. The first (without which the rest must come to
nothing) is intellectual curiosity, desire to know the truth. Then,
professional pride, anxiety to be satisfied with one’s performance,
the shame that overcomes any self-respecting craftsman when his
work is unworthy of his talent. Finally, ambition, desire for
reputation, and the position, even the power or the money, which
it brings. It may be fine to feel, when you have done your work,
that you have added to the happiness or alleviated the sufferings
of others, but that will not be why you did it. So if a mathematician,
or a chemist, or even a physiologist, were to tell me that the
driving force in his work had been the desired to benefit
humanity, then I should not believe him (nor should I think the
better of him if I did). His dominant motives have been those
which I have stated, and in which, surely, there is nothing of
which any decent man need be ashamed.

If intellectual curiosity, professional pride, and ambition are the
dominant incentives to research, then assuredly no one has a
fairer chance of satisfying them than a mathematician. His subject
is the most curious of all—there is none in which truth plays such
odd pranks. It has the most elaborate and the most fascinating
technique, and gives unrivalled openings for the display of sheer
professional skill. Finally, as history proves abundantly,
mathematical achievement, whatever its intrinsic worth, is the
most enduring of all.

We can see this even in semi-historic civilizations. The Babylonian
and Assyrian civilizations have perished; Hammurabi,
Sargon, and Nebuchadnezzar are empty names; yet Babylonian

mathematics is still interesting, and the Babylonian scale of 60 is
still used in astronomy. But of course the crucial case is that of
the Greeks.

The Greeks were the first mathematicians who are still ‘real’ to
us to-day. Oriental mathematics may be an interesting curiosity,
but Greek mathematics is the real thing. The Greeks first spoke a
language which modern mathematicians can understand: as
Littlewood said to me once, they are not clever schoolboys or
‘scholarship candidates’, but ‘Fellows of another college’. So
Greek mathematics is ‘permanent’, more permanent even than
Greek literature. Archimedes will be remembered when Aeschylus
is forgotten, because languages die and mathematical ideas do
not. ‘Immortality’ may be a silly word, but probably a mathematician
has the best chance of whatever it may mean.

Nor need he fear very seriously that the future will be unjust to
him. Immortality is often ridiculous or cruel: few of us would
have chosen to be Og or Ananias or Gallio. Even in mathematics,
history sometimes plays strange tricks; Rolle figures in the textbooks
of elementary calculus as if he had been a mathematician
like Newton; Farey is immortal because he failed to understand a
theorem which Haros had proved perfectly fourteen years before;
the names of five worthy Norwegians still stand in Abel’s Life,
just for one act of conscientious imbecility, dutifully performed at
the expense of their country’s greatest man. But on the whole the
history of science is fair, and this is particularly true in mathematics.
No other subject has such clear-cut or unanimously
accepted standards, and the men who are remembered are almost
always the men who merit it. Mathematical fame, if you have the
cash to pay for it, is one of the soundest and steadiest of investments.

All this is very comforting for dons, and especially for professors
of mathematics. It is sometimes suggested, by lawyers or
politicians or business men, that an academic career is one sought
mainly by cautious and unambitious persons who care primarily
for comfort and security. The reproach is quite misplaced. A don
surrenders something, and in particular the chance of making
large sums of money—it is very hard for a professor to make
￡2000 a year; and security of tenure is naturally one of the
considerations which make this particular surrender easy. That is
not why Housman would have refused to be Lord Simon or Lord
Beaverbrook. He would have rejected their careers because of his
ambition, because he would have scorned to be a man forgotten
in twenty years.

Yet how painful it is to feel that, with all these advantages, one
may fail. I can remember Bertrand Russell telling me of a
horrible dream. He was in the top floor of the University Library,
about A.D. 2100 . A library assistant was going round the shelves
carrying an enormous bucket, taking down books, glancing at
them, restoring them to the shelves or dumping them into the
bucket. At last he came to three large volumes which Russell
could recognize as the last surviving copy of Principia Mathematica.
He took down one of the volumes, turned over a few
pages, seemed puzzled for a moment by the curious symbolism,
closed the volume, balanced it in his hand and hesitated.…

A mathematician, like a painter or a poet, is a maker of patterns.
If his patterns are more permanent than theirs, it is because they
are made with ideas. A painter makes patterns with shapes and
colours, a poet with words. A painting may embody and ‘idea’,
but the idea is usually commonplace and unimportant. In poetry,

ideas count for a good deal more; but, as Housman insisted, the
importance of ideas in poetry is habitually exaggerated: ‘I cannot
satisfy myself that there are any such things as poetical ideas.…
Poetry is no the thing said but a way of saying it.’

Not all the water in the rough rude sea

Can wash the balm from an anointed King.
Could lines be better, and could ideas be at once more trite and
more false? The poverty of the ideas seems hardly to affect the
beauty of the verbal pattern. A mathematician, on the other hand,
has no material to work with but ideas, and so his patterns are
likely to last longer, since ideas wear less with time than words.

The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s
must be beautiful; the ideas like the colours or the words, must fit
together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no
permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics. And here I
must deal with a misconception which is still widespread (though
probably much less so now than it was twenty years ago), what
Whitehead has called the ‘literary superstition’ that love of an
aesthetic appreciation of mathematics is ‘a monomania confined
to a few eccentrics in each generation’.

It would be quite difficult now to find an educated man quite
insensitive to the aesthetic appeal of mathematics. It may be very
hard to define mathematical beauty, but that is just as true of
beauty of any kind—we may not know quite what we mean by a
beautiful poem, but that does not prevent us from recognizing one
when we read it. Even Professor Hogben, who is out to minimize
at all costs the importance of the aesthetic element in mathematics,
does not venture to deny its reality. ‘There are, to be sure,
individuals for whom mathematics exercises a coldly impersonal
attraction.… The aesthetic appeal of mathematics may be very
real for a chosen few.’ But they are ‘few’, he suggests, and they
feel ‘coldly’ (and are really rather ridiculous people, who live in
silly little university towns sheltered from the fresh breezes of the

wide open spaces). In this he is merely echoing Whitehead’s
‘literary superstition’.

The fact is that there are few more ‘popular’ subjects than
mathematics. Most people have some appreciation of mathematics,
just as most people can enjoy a pleasant tune; and there are
probably more people really interested in mathematics than in
music. Appearances suggest the contrary, but there are easy
explanations. Music can be used to stimulate mass emotion, while
mathematics cannot; and musical incapacity is recognized (no
doubt rightly) as mildly discreditable, whereas most people are so
frightened of the name of mathematics that they are ready, quite
unaffectedly, to exaggerate their own mathematical stupidity.

A very little reflection is enough to expose the absurdity of the
‘literary superstition’. There are masses of chess-players in every
civilized country—in Russia, almost the whole educated
population; and every chess-player can recognize and appreciate
a ‘beautiful’ game or problem. Yet a chess problem is simply an
exercise in pure mathematics (a game not entirely, since
psychology also plays a part), and everyone who calls a problem
‘beautiful’ is applauding mathematical beauty, even if it is a
beauty of a comparatively lowly kind. Chess problems are the
hymn-tunes of mathematics.

We may learn the same lesson, at a lower level but for a wider
public, from bridge, or descending farther, from the puzzle
columns of the popular newspapers. Nearly all their immense
popularity is a tribute to the drawing power of rudimentary
mathematics, and the better makers of puzzles, such as Dudeney
or ‘Caliban’, use very little else. They know their business: what
the public wants is a little intellectual ‘kick’, and nothing else has
quite the kick of mathematics.

I might add that there is nothing in the world which pleases
even famous men (and men who have used quite disparaging
words about mathematics) quite so much as to discover, or
rediscover, a genuine mathematical theorem. Herbert Spencer

republished in his autobiography a theorem about circles which
he proved when he was twenty (not knowing that it had been
proved over two thousand years before by Plato). Professor
Soddy is a more recent and more striking example (but his
theorem really is his own)2.

A chess problem is genuine mathematics, but it is in some way
‘trivial’ mathematics. However ingenious and intricate, however
original and surprising the moves, there is something essential
lacking. Chess problems are unimportant. The best mathematics
is serious as well as beautiful—‘important’ if you like, but the
word is very ambiguous, and ‘serious’ expresses what I mean
much better.

I am not thinking of the ‘practical’ consequences of mathematics.
I have to return to that later: at present I will say only that if a
chess problem is, in the crude sense, ‘useless’, then that is equally
true of most of the best mathematics; that very little of mathematics
is useful practically, and that that little is comparatively dull.
The ‘seriousness’ of a mathematical theorem lies, not in its
practical consequences, which are usually negligible, but in the
significance of the mathematical ideas which it connects. We may
say, roughly, that a mathematical idea is ‘significant’ if it can be
connected, in a natural and illuminating way, with a large
complex of other mathematical ideas. Thus a serious mathematical
theorem, a theorem which connects significant ideas, is likely
to lead to important advance in mathematics itself and even in
other sciences. No chess problem has ever affected the general
development of scientific though: Pythagoras, Newton, Einstein
have in their times changed its whole direction.

The seriousness of a theorem, of course, does not lie in its
consequences, which are merely the evidence for its seriousness.

2 See his letter on the ‘Hexlet’ in Nature, vols. 127-9 (1936-7).

Shakespeare had an enormous influence on the development of
the English language, Otway next to none, but that is not why
Shakespeare was the better poet. He was the better poet because
he wrote much better poetry. The inferiority of the chess problem,
like that of Otway’s poetry, lies not in its consequences in its
content.

There is one more points which I shall dismiss very shortly, not
because it is uninteresting but because it is difficult, and because I
have no qualifications for any serious discussion in aesthetics.
The beauty of a mathematical theorem depends a great deal on its
seriousness, as even in poetry the beauty of a line may depend to
some extent on the significance of the ideas which it contains. I
quoted two lines of Shakespeare as an example of the sheer
beauty of a verbal pattern, but

After life’s fitful fever he sleeps well
seems still more beautiful. The pattern is just as fine, and in this
case the ideas have significance and the thesis is sound, so that
our emotions are stirred much more deeply. The ideas do matter
to the pattern, even in poetry, and much more, naturally, in
mathematics; but I must not try the argue the question seriously.

It will be clear by now that, if we are to have any chance of
making progress, I must produce example of ‘real’ mathematical
theorems, theorems which every mathematician will admit to be
first-rate. And here I am very handicapped by the restrictions
under which I am writing. On the one hand my examples must be
very simple, and intelligible to a reader who has no specialized
mathematical knowledge; no elaborate preliminary explanations
must be needs; and a reader must be able to follow the proofs as
well as the enunciations. These conditions exclude, for instance,
many of the most beautiful theorems of the theory of numbers,
such as Fermat’s ‘two square’ theorem on the law of quadratic

reciprocity. And on the other hand my examples should be drawn
from the ‘pukka’ mathematics, the mathematics of the working
professional mathematician; and this condition excludes a good
deal which it would be comparatively easy to make intelligible
but which trespasses on logic and mathematical philosophy.

I can hardly do better than go back to the Greeks. I will state
and prove two of the famous theorems of Greek mathematics.
They are ‘simple’ theorems, simple both in idea and in execution,
but there is no doubt at all about their being theorems of the
highest class. Each is as fresh and significant as when it has
discovered—two thousand years have not written a wrinkle on
either of them. Finally, both the statements and the proofs can be
mastered in an hour by any intelligent reader, however slender his
mathematical equipment.

1. The first is Euclid’s3 proof of the existence of an infinity of
prime numbers.
The prime numbers or primes are the numbers

(A) 2,3,5,7,11,13,17,19,23,29,…
which cannot be resolved into smaller factors4. Thus 37 and 317
are prime. The primes are the material out of which all numbers
are built up by multiplication: thus 666 = 2 . 3. 3. 37 . Every number
which is not prime itself is divisible by at least one prime
(usually, of course, by several). We have to prove that there are
infinitely many primes, i.e. that the series (A) never comes to an
end.
Let us suppose that it does, and that

2, 3, 5, …
, P
is the complete series (so that P is the largest prime); and let us,
on this hypothesis, consider the number Q defined by the formula
Q = (2 . 3. 5.... P) +1.

3 Elements IX 20. The real origin of many theorems in the Elements is obscure, and there
seems to be no particular reason for supposing that this one is not Euclid’s own.
4 There are technical reasons for not counting 1 as a prime.

It is plain that Q is not divisible by and of 2, 3, 5, …, P ; for it
leaves the remainder 1 when divided by any one of these
numbers. But, if not itself prime, it is divisible by some prime,
and therefore there is a prime (which may be Q itself) greater
than any of them. This contradicts our hypothesis, that there is no
prime greater than P ; and therefore this hypothesis is false. P ; and therefore this hypothesis is false.

The proof is by reductio ad absurdum, and reductio ad absurdum,
which Euclid loved so much, is one of a mathematician’s
finest weapons5. It is a far finer gambit than any chess gambit: a
chess player may offer the sacrifice of a pawn or even a piece, but
a mathematician offers the game.

2. My second example is Pythagoras’s6 proof of the ‘irrationality’
of 2 . A ‘rational number’ is fraction a , where a and b are

b
integers: we may suppose that a and b have no common factor,
since if they had we could remove it. To say that ‘ 2 is irrational’
is merely another way of saying that 2 cannot be expressed

..
.

in the form

; and this is the same as saying that the equation

(B) a2 = 2b2
cannot be satisfied by integral values of a and b which have no
common factor. This is a theorem of pure arithmetic, which does
not demand any knowledge of ‘irrational numbers’ or depend on
any theory about their nature.
We argue again by reductio ad absurdum; we suppose that (B)
is true, a and b being integers without any common factor. It
follows from (B) that a2 is even (since 2b2 is divisible by 2), and

5 The proof can be arranged so as to avoid a reductio, and logicians of some schools would
prefer that it should be.
6 The proof traditionally ascribed to Pythagoras, and certainly a product of his school. The
theorem occurs, in a much more general form, in Euclid (Elements X 9).

therefore that a is even (since the square of an odd number is
odd). If a is even then

2b = a = (2c) = 4c
or

(D) b2 = 2c2
Hence b2 is even, and therefore (for the same reason as before)
b is even. That is to say, a and b are both even, and so have
common factor 2 . This contradicts our hypothesis, and therefore
the hypothesis is false.
It follows from Pythagoras’s theorem that the diagonal of a
square is incommensurable with the side (that their ratio is not a
rational number, that there is no unit of which both are integral
multiples). For if we take the side as our unit of length, and the
length of the diagonal is d , then, by a very familiar theorem also
ascribed to Pythagoras7,

2 22

d = 1 +1 = 2
So that d cannot be a rational number.

I could quote any number of fine theorems from the theory of
numbers whose meaning anyone can understand. For example,
there is what is called ‘the fundamental theorem of arithmetic’,
that any integer can be resolved, in one way only, into a product
of primes. Thus 666 = 2 . 3. 3. 37 , and there is no other decomposition;
it is impossible that 666 =2 .11. 29 or that 13.89 = 17 . 73 (and
we can see so without working out the products). This theorem is,
as its name implies, the foundation of higher arithmetic; but the
proof, although not ‘difficult’, requires a certain amount of
preface and might be found tedious by an unmathematical reader.

Another famous and beautiful theorem is Fermat’s ‘two
square’ theorem. The primes may (if we ignore the special prime
2) be arranged in two classes; the primes

5,13,17, 29,37, 41,…

7 Euclid, Elements I 47.

which leave remainder 1 when divided by 4, and the primes

3, 7,11,19, 23,31,…
which leave remainder 3. All the primes of the first class, and
none of the second, can be expressed as the sum of two integral
squares: thus

22 22

5 = 1 + 2, 13 = 2 + 3,

22 22

17 = 1 + 4, 29 = 2 + 5;
but 3, 7, 11, and 19 are not expressible in this way (as the reader
may check by trial). This is Fermat’s theorem, which is ranked,
very justly, as one of the finest of arithmetic. Unfortunately, there
is no proof within the comprehension of anybody but a fairly
expert mathematician.

There are also beautiful theorems in the ‘theory of aggregates’
(Mengenlehre), such as Cantor’s theorem of the ‘nonenumerability’
of the continuum. Here there is just the opposite
difficulty. The proof is easy enough, when once the language has
been mastered, but considerable explanation is necessary before
the meaning of the theorem becomes clear. So I will not try to
give more examples. Those which I have given are test cases, and
a reader who cannot appreciate them is unlikely to appreciate
anything in mathematics.

I said that a mathematician was a maker of patterns of ideas,
and that beauty and seriousness were the criteria by which his
patterns should be judged. I can hardly believe that anyone who
has understood the two theorems will dispute that they pass these
tests. If we compare them with Dudeney’s most ingenious
puzzles, or the finest chess problems the masters of that art have
composed, their superiority in both respects stands out: there is an
unmistakable difference of class. They are much more serious,
and also much more beautiful: can define, a little more closely,
where their superiority lies?

In the first place, the superiority of the mathematical theorems in
seriousness is obvious and overwhelming. The chess problem is
the product of an ingenious but very limited complex of ideas,
which do not differ from one another very fundamentally and
have no external repercussions. We should think in the same way
if chess had never been invented, whereas the theorems of Euclid
and Pythagoras have influenced thought profoundly, even outside
mathematics.

Thus Euclid’s theorem is vital for the whole structure of
arithmetic. The primes are the raw material out of which we have
to build arithmetic, and Euclid’s theorem assures us that we have
plenty of material for the task. But the theorem of Pythagoras has
wider applications and provides a better text.

We should observe first that Pythagoras’s argument is capable
of far reaching extension, and can be applied, with little change of
principle to very wide classes of ‘irrationals’. We can prove very
similarly (as Theaetetus seems to have done) that

3, 5, 11, 13, 17
are irrational, or (going beyond Theaetetus) that 3 2 and 3 17 are
irrational8.

Euclid’s theorem tells us that we have a good supply of material
for the construction of a coherent arithmetic of the integers.
Pythagoras’s theorem and its extensions tell us that, when we
have constructed this arithmetic, it will not prove sufficient for
our needs, since there will be many magnitudes which obtrude
themselves upon our attention and which it will be unable to
measure: the diagonal of the square is merely the most obvious
example. The profound importance of this discovery was
recognized at once by the Greek mathematicians. They had begun

8 See Ch. IV of Hardy and Wright’s Introduction to the Theory of Numbers, where there are
discussions of different generalizations of Pythagoras’s argument, and of a historical
puzzled about Theaetetus.

by assuming (in accordance, I suppose, with the ‘natural’ dictates
of ‘common sense’) that all magnitudes of the same kind are
commensurable, that any two lengths, for example, are multiples
of some common unit, and they had constructed a theory of
proportion based on this assumption. Pythagoras’s discovery
exposed the unsoundness of this foundation, and led to the
construction of the much more profound theory of Eudoxus
which is set out in the fifth book of the Elements, and which is
regarded by many modern mathematicians as the finest achievement
of Greek mathematics. The theory is astonishingly modern
in spirit, and may be regarded as the beginning of the modern
theory of irrational number, which has revolutionized mathematical
analysis and had much influence on recent philosophy.

There is no doubt at all, then, of the ‘seriousness’ of either
theorem. It is therefore the better worth remarking that neither
theorem has the slightest ‘practical’ importance. In practical
application we are concerned only with comparatively small
numbers; only stellar astronomy and atomic physics deal with
‘large’ numbers, and they have very little more practical
importance, as yet, than the most abstract pure mathematics. I do
not know what is the highest degree of accuracy ever useful to an
engineer—we shall be very generous if we say ten significant
figures. Then

3.14159265
(the value of π to eight places of decimals) is the ratio

314159265

1000000000
of two numbers of ten digits. The number of primes less than
1,000,000,000 is 50,847,478 : that is enough for an engineer, and he
can be perfectly happy without the rest. So much for Euclid’s
theorem; and, as regards Pythagoras’s, it is obvious that irrationals
are uninteresting to an engineer, since he is concerned only
with approximations, and all approximations are rational.

A ‘serious’ theorem is a theorem which contains ‘significant’
ideas, and I suppose that I ought to try to analyse a little more
closely the qualities which make a mathematical idea significant.
This is very difficult, and it is unlikely that any analysis which I
can give will be very valuable. We can recognize a ‘significant’
idea when we see it, as we can those which occur in my two
standard theorems; but this power of recognition requires a high
degree of mathematical sophistication, and of that familiarity with
mathematical ideas which comes only from many years spent in
their company. So I must attempt some sort of analysis; and it
should be possible to make one which, however inadequate, is
sound and intelligible so far as it goes. There are two things at
any rate which seem essential, a certain generality and a certain
depth; but neither quality is easy to define at all precisely.

A significant mathematical idea, a serious mathematical
theorem, should be ‘general’ in some such sense as this. The idea
should be one which is a constituent in many mathematical
constructs, which is used in the proof of theorems of many
different kinds. The theorem should be one which, even if stated
originally (like Pythagoras’s theorem) in a quite special form, is
capable of considerable extension and is typical of a whole class
of theorems of its kind. The relations revealed by the proof
should be such as to connect many different mathematical ideas.
All this is very vague, and subject to many reservations. But it is
easy enough to see that a theorem is unlikely to be serious when it
lacks these qualities conspicuously; we have only to take
examples from the isolated curiosities in which arithmetic
abounds. I take two, almost at random, from Rouse Ball’s
Mathematical Recreations9 .

(a) 8712 and 9801 are the only four-figure numbers which are
integral multiples of their ‘reversals’:
9 11th edition, 1939 (revised by H. S. M. Coxeter).

8712 = 4 . 2178, 9801 = 9 .1089

and there are no other numbers below 10,000 which have this
property.

(b) There are just four number (after 1) which are the sums of
the cubes of their digits, viz.
333 333

153 = 1 + 5 + 3 , 370 = 3 + 7 + 0,

333 333

371 = 3 + 7 +1 , 407 = 4 + 0 + 7.

These are odd facts, very suitable for puzzle columns and
likely to amuse amateurs, but there is nothing in them which
appeals much to a mathematician. The proofs are neither difficult
nor interesting—merely a little tiresome. The theorems are not
serious; and it is plain that one reason (though perhaps not the
most important) is the extreme speciality of both the enunciations
and the proofs, which are not capable of any significant generalization.

‘Generality’ is an ambiguous and rather dangerous word, and we
must be careful not to allow it to dominate our discussion too
much. It is used in various senses both in mathematics and in
writings about mathematics, and there is one of these in particular,
on which logicians have very properly laid great stress, which
is entirely irrelevant here. In this sense, which is quite easy to
define, all mathematical theorems are equally and completely
general.

‘The certainty of mathematics’, says Whitehead10, ‘depends on
its complete abstract generality.’ When we assert that 2 + 3 = 5, we
are asserting a relation between three groups of ‘things’; and
these ‘things’ are not apples or pennies, or things of any one
particular sort or another, but just things, ‘any old things’. The
meaning of the statement is entirely independent of the individualities
of the members of the groups. All mathematical ‘objects’

10 Science and the Modern World, p. 33.

or ‘entities’ or ‘relations’, such as ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘ + ’, or ‘ = ’, and all
mathematical propositions in which they occur, are completely
general in the sense of being completely abstract. Indeed one of
Whitehead’s words is superfluous, since generality, in this sense,
is abstractness.

This sense of the word is important, and the logicians are quite
right to stress it, since it embodies a truism which a good many
people who ought to know better are apt to forget. It is quite
common, for example, for an astronomer or a physicist to claim
that he has found a ‘mathematical proof’ that the physical
universe must behave in a particular way. All such claim, if
interpreted literally, are strictly nonsense. It cannot be possible to
prove mathematically that there will be an eclipse to-morrow,
because eclipses, and other physical phenomena, do not form part
of the abstract world of mathematics; and this, I suppose, all
astronomers would admit when pressed, however many eclipses
they may have predicted correctly.

It is obvious that we are not concerned with this sort of ‘generality’
now. We are looking for differences of generality between
one mathematical theorem and another, and in Whitehead’s sense
all are equally general. Thus the ‘trivial’ theorems (a) and (b) of
§15 are just as ‘abstract’ or ‘general’ as those of Euclid and
Pythagoras, and so is a chess problem. It makes no difference to a
chess problem whether the pieces are white and black, or red and
green, or whether there are physical ‘pieces’ at all; it is the same
problem which an expert carries easily in his head and which we
have to reconstruct laboriously with the aid of the board. The
board and the pieces are mere devices to stimulate our sluggish
imaginations, and are no more essential to the problem than the
blackboard and the chalk are to the theorems in a mathematical
lecture.

It is not this kind of generality, common to all mathematical
theorems, which we are looking for now, but the more subtle and
elusive kind of generality which I tried to describe in rough terms

in §15. And we must be careful not to lay too much stress even on
generality of this kind (as I think logicians like Whitehead tend to
do). It is not mere ‘piling of subtlety of generalization upon
subtlety of generalization’11 which is the outstanding achievement
of modern mathematics. Some measure of generality must be
present in any high-class theorem, but too much tends inevitably
to insipidity. ‘Everything is what it is, and not another thing’, and
the differences between things are quite as interesting as their
resemblances. We do not choose our friends because they
embody all the pleasant qualities of humanity, but because they
are the people that they are. And so in mathematics; a property
common to too many objects can hardly be very exciting, and
mathematical ideas also become dim unless they have plenty of
individuality. Here at any rate I can quote Whitehead on my side:
‘it is the large generalization, limited by a happy particularity,
which is the fruitful conception12.’

The second quality which I demanded in a significant idea was
depth, and this is still more difficult to define. It has something to
do with difficulty; the ‘deeper’ ideas are usually the harder to
grasp: but it is not at all the same. The ideas underlying Pythagoras’s
theorem and its generalization are quite deep, but no
mathematicians now would find them difficult. On the other hand
a theorem may be essentially superficial and yet quite difficult to
prove (as are many ‘Diophantine’ theorems, i.e. theorems about
the solution of equations in integers).

It seems that mathematical ideas are arranged somehow in
strata, the ideas in each stratum being linked by a complex of
relations both among themselves and with those above and
below. The lower the stratum, the deeper (and in general more

11 Science and the Modern World, p. 44.
12 Science and the Modern World, p. 46.

difficult) the idea. Thus the idea of an ‘irrational’ is deeper than
that of an integer; and Pythagoras’s theorem is, for that reason,
deeper than Euclid’s.

Let us concentrate our attention on the relations between the
integers, or some other group of objects lying in some particular
stratum. Then it may happen that one of these relations can be
comprehended completely, that we can recognize and prove, for
example, some property of the integers, without any knowledge
of the contents of lower strata. Thus we proved Euclid’s theorem
by consideration of properties of integers only. But there are also
many theorems about integers which we cannot appreciate
properly, and still less prove, without digging deeper and
considering what happens below.

It is easy to find examples in the theory of prime numbers.
Euclid’s theorem is very important, but not very deep: we can
prove that there are infinitely many primes without using any
notion deeper than that of ‘divisibility’. But new questions
suggest themselves as soon as we know the answer to this one.
There is an infinity of primes, but how is the infinity distributed?

101010 13

Given a large number N, say 1080 or , about how many
primes are there less than N?14 When we ask these questions, we
find ourselves in a different position. We can answer them, with
rather surprising accuracy, but only by boring much deeper,
leaving the integers above us for a while, and using the most
powerful weapons of the modern theory of functions. Thus the
theorem which answers our questions (the so-called ‘Prime
Number Theorem’) is a much deeper theorem than Euclid’s or
even Pythagoras’s.

I could multiply examples, but this notion of ‘depth’ is an
elusive one even for a mathematician who can recognize it, and I

13 It is supposed that the number of protons in the universe is about 1080 . The number 101010 ,
if written at length, would occupy about 50,000 volumes of average size.
14 As I mentioned in §14, there are 50,847,478 primes less than 1,000,000,000; but that is as
far as our exact knowledge extends.

can hardly suppose that I could say anything more about it here
that would be of much help to other readers.

There is still one point remaining over from §11, where I started
the comparison between ‘real mathematics’ and chess. We may
take it for granted now that in substance, seriousness, significance,
the advantage of the real mathematical theorem is
overwhelming. It is almost equally obvious, to a trained intelligence,
that it has a great advantage in beauty also; but this
advantage is much harder to define or locate, since the main
defect of the chess problem is plainly its ‘triviality’, and the
contrast in this respect mingles with and disturbs any more purely
aesthetic judgement. What ‘purely aesthetic’ qualities can we
distinguish in such theorems as Euclid’s or Pythagoras’s? I will
not risk more than a few disjointed remarks.

In both theorems (and in the theorems, of course, I include the
proofs) there is a very high degree of unexpectedness, combined
with inevitability and economy. The arguments take so odd and
surprising a form; the weapons used seem so childishly simple
when compared with the far-reaching results; but there is no
escape from the conclusions. There are no complications of
detail—one line of attack is enough in each case; and this is true
too of the proofs of many much more difficult theorems, the full
appreciation of which demands quite a high degree of technical
proficiency. We do not want many ‘variations’ in the proof of a
mathematical theorem: ‘enumeration of cases’, indeed, is one of
the duller forms of mathematical argument. A mathematical proof
should resemble a simple and clear-cut constellation, not a
scattered cluster in the Milky Way.

A chess problem also has unexpectedness, and a certain economy;
it is essential that the moves should be surprising, and that
every piece of the board should play its part. But the aesthetic

effect is cumulative. It is essential also (unless the problem is too
simple to be really amusing) that the key-move should be
followed by a good many variations, each requiring its own
individual answer. ‘If P-B5 then Kt-R6; if …. then ….; if …. then
….’—the effect would be spoilt if there were not a good many
different replies. All this is quite genuine mathematics, and has its
merits; but it is just that ‘proof by enumeration of cases’ (and of
cases which do not, at bottom, differ at all profoundly15) which a
real mathematician tends to despise.

I am inclined to think that I could reinforce my argument by
appealing to the feelings of chess-players themselves. Surely a
chess master, a player of great games and great matches, at
bottom scorns a problemist’s purely mathematical art. He has
much of it in reserve himself, and can produce it in an emergency:
‘if he had made such and such a move, then I had such and
such a winning combination in mind.’ But the ‘great game’ of
chess is primarily psychological, a conflict between one trained
intelligence and another, and not a mere collection of small
mathematical theorems.

I must return to my Oxford apology, and examine a little more
carefully some of the points which I postponed in §6. It will be
obvious by now that I am interested in mathematics only as a
creative art. But there are other questions to be considered, and in
particular that of the ‘utility’ (or uselessness) of mathematics,
about which there is much confusion of thought. We must also
consider whether mathematics is really quite so ‘harmless’ as I
took for granted in my Oxford lecture.

A science or an art may be said to be ‘useful’ if its development
increases, even indirectly, the material well-being and

15 I believe that it is now regarded as a merit in a problem that there should be many
variations of the same type.

comfort of men, if it promotes happiness, using that word in a
crude an commonplace way. Thus medicine and physiology are
useful because they relieve suffering, and engineering is useful
because it helps us to build houses and bridges, and so to raise the
standard of life (engineering, of course, does harm as well, but
that is not the question at the moment). Now some mathematics is
certainly useful in this way; the engineers could not do their job
without a fair working knowledge of mathematics, and mathematics
is beginning to find applications even in physiology. So here
we have a possible ground for a defence of mathematics; it may
not be the best, or even a particularly strong defence, but it is one
which we must examine. The ‘nobler’ uses of mathematics, if
such they be, the uses which it shares with all creative art, will be
irrelevant to our examination. Mathematics may, like poetry or
music, ‘promote and sustain a lofty habit of mind’, and so
increase the happiness of mathematicians and even of other
people; but to defend it on that ground would be merely to
elaborate what I have said already. What we have to consider
now is the ‘crude’ utility of mathematics.

All this may seem very obvious, but even here there is often a
good deal of confusion, since the most ‘useful’ subjects are quite
commonly just those which it is most useless for most of us to
learn. It is useful to have an adequate supply of physiologists and
engineers; but physiology and engineering are not useful studies
for ordinary men (though their study may of course be defended
on other grounds). For my own part I have never once found
myself in a position where such scientific knowledge as I possess,
outside pure mathematics, has brought me the slightest advantage.

It is indeed rather astonishing how little practical value scientific
knowledge has for ordinary men, how dull and commonplace

such of it as has value is, and how its value seems almost to vary
inversely to its reputed utility. It is useful to be tolerably quick at
common arithmetic (and that, of course, is pure mathematics). It
is useful to know a little French or German, a little history and
geography, perhaps even a little economics. But a little chemistry,
physics, or physiology has no value at all in ordinary life. We
know that the gas will burn without knowing its constitution;
when our cars break down we take them to a garage; when our
stomach is out of order, we go to a doctor or a drugstore. We live
either by rule of thumb or on other people’s professional
knowledge.

However, this is a side issue, a matter of pedagogy, interesting
only to schoolmasters who have to advise parents clamouring for
a ‘useful’ education for their sons. Of course we do not mean,
when we say that physiology is useful, that most people ought to
study physiology, but that the development of physiology by a
handful of experts will increase the comfort of the majority. The
questions which are important for us now are, how far mathematics
can claim this sort of utility, what kinds of mathematics can
make the strongest claims, and how far the intensive study of
mathematics, as it is understood by mathematicians, can be
justified on this ground alone.

It will probably be plain by now to what conclusions I am
coming; so I will state them at once dogmatically and then
elaborate them a little. It is undeniable that a good deal of
elementary mathematics—and I use the word ‘elementary’ in the
sense in which professional mathematicians use it, in which it
includes, for example, a fair working knowledge of the differential
and integral calculus—has considerable practical utility.
These parts of mathematics are, on the whole, rather dull; they are
just the parts which have the least aesthetic value. The ‘real’

mathematics of the ‘real’ mathematicians, the mathematics of
Fermat and Euler and Gauss and Abel and Riemann, is almost
wholly ‘useless’ (and this is as true of ‘applied’ as of ‘pure’
mathematics). It is not possible to justify the life of any genuine
professional mathematician on the ground of the ‘utility’ of his
work.

But here I must deal with a misconception. It is sometimes
suggested that pure mathematicians glory in the uselessness of
their work16, and make it a boast that it has no practical applications.
The imputation is usually based on an incautious saying
attributed to Gauss, to the effect that, if mathematics is the queen
of the sciences, then the theory of numbers is, because of its
supreme uselessness, the queen of mathematics—I have never
been able to find an exact quotation. I am sure that Gauss’s
saying (if indeed it be his) has been rather crudely misinterpreted.
If the theory of numbers could be employed for any practical and
obviously honourable purpose, if it could be turned directly to the
furtherance of human happiness or the relief of human suffering,
as physiology and even chemistry can, then surely neither Gauss
nor any other mathematician would have been so foolish as to
decry or regret such applications. But science works for evil as
well as for good (and particularly, of course, in time of war); and
both Gauss and less mathematicians may be justified in rejoicing
that there is one science at any rate, and that their own, whose
very remoteness from ordinary human activities should keep it
gentle and clean.

16 I have been accused of taking this view myself. I once said that ‘a science is said to be
useful if its development tends to accentuate the existing inequalities in the distribution of
wealth, or more directly promotes the destruction of human life’, and this sentence, written
in 1915, has been quoted (for or against me) several times. It was of course a conscious
rhetorical flourish, though one perhaps excusable at the time when it was written.

There is another misconception against which we must guard. It
is quite natural to suppose that there is a great difference in utility
between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ mathematics. This is a delusion:
there is a sharp disctinction between the two kinds of mathematics,
which I will explain in a moment, but it hardly affects their
utility.

How do pure and applied mathematicians differ from one
another? This is a question which can be answered definitely and
about which there is general agreement among mathematicians.
There will be nothing in the least unorthodox about my answer,
but it needs a little preface.

My next two sections will have a mildly philosophical flavour.
The philosophy will not cut deep, or be in any way vital to my
main theses; but I shall use words which are used very frequently
with definite philosophical implications, and a reader might well
become confused if I did not explain how I shall use them.

I have often used the adjective ‘real’, and as we use it commonly
in conversation. I have spoken of ‘real mathematics’ and
‘real mathematicians’, as I might have spoken of ‘real poetry’ or
‘real poets’, and I shall continue to do so. But I shall also use the
word ‘reality’, and with two different connotations.

In the first place, I shall speak of ‘physical reality’, and here
again I shall be using the word in the ordinary sense. By physical
reality I mean the material world, the world of day and night,
earthquakes and eclipses, the world which physical science tries
to describe.

I hardly suppose that, up to this point, any reader is likely to
find trouble with my language, but now I am near to more
difficult ground. For me, and I suppose for most mathematicians,
there is another reality, which I will call ‘mathematical reality’;
and there is no sort of agreement about the nature of mathematical
reality among either mathematicians or philosophers. Some

hold that it is ‘mental’ and that in some sense we construct it,
others that it is outside and independent of us. A man who could
give a convincing account of mathematical reality would have
solved very many of the most difficult problems of metaphysics.
If he could include physical reality in his account, he would have
solved them all.

I should not wish to argue any of these questions here even if I
were competent to do so, but I will state my own position
dogmatically in order to avoid minor misapprehensions. I believe
that mathematical reality lies outside us, that our function is to
discover or observe it, and that the theorems which we prove, and
which we describe grandiloquently as our ‘creations’, are simply
our notes of our observations. This view has been held, in one
form or another, by many philosophers of high reputation from
Plato onwards, and I shall use the language which is natural to a
man who holds it. A reader who does not the philosophy can alter
the language: it will make very little difference to my conclusions.

The contrast between pure and applied mathematics stands out
most clearly, perhaps, in geometry. There is the science of pure
geometry17, in which there are many geometries, projective
geometry, Euclidean geometry, non-Euclidean geometry, and so
forth. Each of these geometries is a model, a pattern of ideas, and
is to be judged by the interest and beauty of its particular pattern.
It is a map or picture, the joint product of many hands, a partial
and imperfect copy (yet exact so far as it extends) of a section of
mathematical reality. But the point which is important to us now
is this, that there is one thing at any rate of which pure geometries
are not pictures, and that is the spatio-temporal reality of the

17 We must of course, for the purpose of this discussion, count as pure geometry what
mathematicians call ‘analytical’ geometry.

physical world. It is obvious, surely, that they cannot be, since
earthquakes and eclipses are not mathematical concepts.

The may sound a little paradoxical to an outsider, but it is a
truism to a geometer; and I may perhaps be able to make it clearer
by an illustration. Let us suppose that I am giving a lecture on
some system of geometry, such as ordinary Euclidean geometry,
and that I draw figures on the blackboard to stimulate the
imagination of my audience, rough drawings of straight lines or
circles or ellipses. It is plain, first, that the truth of the theorems
which I prove is in no way affected by the quality of my
drawings. Their function is merely to bring home my meaning to
my hearers, and, if I can do that, there would be no gain in having
them redrawn by the most skilful draughtsman. They are
pedagogical illustrations, not part of the real subject-matter of the
lecture.

Now let us go a stage further. The room in which I am lecturing
is part of the physical world, and has itself a certain pattern.
The study of that pattern, and of the general pattern of physical
reality, is a science in itself, which we may call ‘physical
geometry’. Suppose now that a violent dynamo, or a massive
gravitating body, is introduced into the room. Then the physicists
tell us that the geometry of the room is changed, its whole
physical pattern slightly but definitely distorted. Do the theorems
which I have proved become false? Surely it would be nonsense
to suppose that the proofs of them which I have given are affected
in any way. It would be like supposing that a play of Shakespeare
is changed when a reader spills his tea over a page. The play is
independent of the pages on which it is printed, and ‘pure
geometries’ are independent of lecture rooms, or of any other
detail of the physical world.

This is the points of view a pure mathematician. Applied
mathematicians, mathematical physicists, naturally take a
different view, since they are preoccupied with the physical world
itself, which also has it structure or pattern. We cannot describe

this pattern exactly, as we can that of a pure geometry, but we can
say something significant about it. We can describe, sometimes
fairly accurately, sometimes very roughly, the relations which
hold between some of its constituents, and compare them with the
exact relations holding between constituents of some system of
pure geometry. We may be able to trace a certain resemblance
between the two sets of relations, and then the pure geometry will
become interesting to physicists; it will give us, to that extent, a
map which ‘fits the facts’ of the physical world. The geometer
offers to the physicist a whole set of maps from which to choose.
One map, perhaps, will fit the facts better than others, and then
the geometry which provides that particular map will be the
geometry most important for applied mathematics. I may add that
even a pure mathematician may find his appreciation of this
geometry quickened, since there is no mathematician so pure that
he feels no interest at all in the physical world; but, in so far as he
succumbs to this temptations, he will be abandoning his purely
mathematical position.

There is another remark which suggests itself here and which
physicists may find paradoxical, though the paradox will
probably seem a good deal less than it did eighteen years ago. I
will express in much the same words which I used in 1922 in an
address to Section A of the British Association. My audience
there was composed almost entirely of physicists, and I may have
spoken a little provocatively on that account; but I would still
stand by the substance of what I said.

I began by saying that there is probably less difference between
the positions of a mathematician and of a physicist than is
generally supposed, and that the most important seems to me to
be this, that the mathematician is in much more direct contact
with reality. This may seem a paradox, since it is the physicist

who deals with the subject-matter usually described as ‘real’; but
a very little reflection is enough to show that the physicist’s
reality, whatever it may be, has few or none of the attributes
which common sense ascribes instinctively to reality. A chair
may be a collection of whirling electrons, or an idea in the mind
of God: each of these accounts of it may have its merits, but
neither conforms at all closely to the suggestions of common
sense.

I went on to say that neither physicists nor philosophers have
ever given any convincing account of what ‘physical reality’ is,
or of how the physicist passes, from the confused mass of fact or
sensation with which he starts, to the construction of the objects
which he calls ‘real’. Thus we cannot be said to know what the
subject-matter of physics is; but this need not prevent us from
understanding roughly what a physicist is trying to do. It is plain
that he is trying to correlate the incoherent body of crude fact
confronting him with some definite and orderly scheme of
abstract relations, the kind of scheme he can borrow only from
mathematics.

A mathematician, on the other hand, is working with his own
mathematical reality. Of this reality, as I explained in §22, I take
a ‘realistic’ and not an ‘idealistic’ view. At any rate (and this was
my main point) this realistic view is much more plausible of
mathematical than of physical reality, because mathematical
objects are so much more than what they seem. A chair or a star
is not in the least like what it seems to be; the more we think of it,
the fuzzier its outlines become in the haze of sensation which
surrounds it; but ‘2’ or ‘317’ has nothing to do with sensation,
and its properties stand out the more clearly the more closely we
scrutinize it. It may be that modern physics fits best into some
framework of idealistic philosophy—I do not believe it, but there
are eminent physicists who say so. Pure mathematics, on the
other hand, seems to me a rock on which all idealism founders:
317 is a prime, not because we think so, or because our minds are

shaped in one way rather than another, but because it is, because
mathematical reality is built that way.

These distinctions between pure and applied mathematics are
important in themselves, but they have very little bearing on our
discussion of the ‘usefulness’ of mathematics. I spoke in §21 of
the ‘real’ mathematics of Fermat and other great mathematicians,
the mathematics which has permanent aesthetic value, as for
example the best Greek mathematics has, the mathematics which
is eternal because the best of it may, like the best literature,
continue to cause intense emotional satisfaction to thousands of
people after thousands of years. These men were all primarily
pure mathematicians (though the distinction was naturally a good
deal less sharp in their days than it is now); but I was not thinking
only of pure mathematics. I count Maxwell and Einstein,
Eddington and Dirac, among ‘real’ mathematicians. The great
modern achievements of applied mathematics have been in
relativity and quantum mechanics, and these subjects are, at
present at any rate, almost as ‘useless’ as the theory of numbers.
It is the dull and elementary parts of applied mathematics, as it is
the dull and elementary parts of pure mathematics, that work for
good or ill. Time may change all this. No one foresaw the
applications of matrices and groups and other purely mathematical
theories to modern physics, and it may be that some of the
‘highbrow’ applied mathematics will become ‘useful’ in as
unexpected a way; but the evidence so far points to the conclusion
that, in one subject as in the other, it is what is commonplace
and dull that counts for practical life.

I can remember Eddington giving a happy example of the
unattractiveness of ‘useful’ science. The British Association held
a meeting in Leeds, and it was thought that the members might
like to hear something of the applications of science to the ‘heavy

woollen’ industry. But the lectures and demonstrations arranged
for this purpose were rather a fiasco. It appeared that the
members (whether citizens of Leeds or not) wanted to be
entertained, and the ‘heavy wool’ is not at all an entertaining
subject. So the attendance at these lectures was very disappointing;
but those who lectured on the excavations at Knossos, or on
relativity, or on the theory or prime numbers, were delighted by
the audiences that they drew.

What parts of mathematics are useful?

First, the bulk of school mathematics, arithmetic, elementary
algebra, elementary Euclidean geometry, elementary differential
and integral calculus. We must except a certain amount of what is
taught to ‘specialist’, such as projective geometry. In applied
mathematics, the elements of mechanics (electricity, as taught in
schools, must be classified as physics).

Next, a fair proportion of university mathematics is also useful,
that part of it which is really a development of school mathematics
with a more finished technique, and a certain amount of the
more physical subjects such as electricity and hydromechanics.
We must also remember that a reserve of knowledge is always an
advantage, and that the most practical of mathematicians may be
seriously handicapped if his knowledge is the bare minimum
which is essential to him; and for this reason we must add a little
under every heading. But our general conclusion must be that
such mathematics is useful as is wanted by a superior engineer or
a moderate physicist; and that is roughly the same thing as to say,
such mathematics as has no particular aesthetic merit. Euclidean
geometry, for example, is useful in so far as it is dull—we do not
want the axiomatics of parallels, or the theory of proportion, or
the construction of the regular pentagon.

One rather curious conclusion emerges, that pure mathematics
is one the whole distinctly more useful than applied. A pure
mathematician seems to have the advantage on the practical as
well as on the aesthetic side. For what is useful above all is
technique, and mathematical technique is taught mainly through
pure mathematics.

I hope that I need not say that I am trying to decry mathematical
physics, a splendid subject with tremendous problems where
the finest imaginations have run riot. But is not the position of an
ordinary applied mathematician in some ways a little pathetic? If
he wants to be useful, he must work in a humdrum way, and he
cannot give full play to his fancy even when he wishes to rise to
the heights. ‘Imaginary’ universes are so much more beautiful
than this stupidly constructed ‘real’ one; and most of the finest
products of an applied mathematician’s fancy must be rejected, as
soon as they have been created, for the brutal but sufficient
reason that they do not fit the facts.

The general conclusion, surely, stands out plainly enough. If
useful knowledge is, as we agreed provisionally to say, knowledge
which is likely, now or in the comparatively near future, to
contribute to the material comfort of mankind, so that mere
intellectual satisfaction is irrelevant, then the great bulk of higher
mathematics is useless. Modern geometry and algebra, the theory
of numbers, the theory of aggregates and functions, relativity,
quantum mechanics—no one of the stands the test much better
than another, and there is no real mathematician whose life can be
justified on this round. If this be the best, then Abel, Riemann,
and Poincaré wasted their lives; their contribution to human
comfort was negligible, and the world would have been as happy
a place without them.

It may be objected that the concept of ‘utility’ has been too
narrow, that I have define it in terms of ‘happiness’ or ‘comfort’
only, and have ignored the general ‘social’ effects of mathematics
on which recent writers, with very different sympathies, have laid
so much stress. Thus Whitehead (who has been a mathematician)
speaks of ‘the tremendous effort of mathematical knowledge on
the lives of men, on their daily avocations, on the organization of
society’; and Hogben (who is as unsympathetic to what I and
other mathematicians call mathematics as Whitehead is sympathetic)
says that ‘without a knowledge of mathematics, the
grammar of size and order, we cannot plan the rational society in
which there will be leisure for all and poverty for none’ (and
much more to the same effect).

I cannot really believe that all this eloquence will do much to
comfort mathematicians. The language of both writers is violently
exaggerated, and both of them ignore very obvious distinctions.
This is very natural in Hogben’s case, since he is admittedly not a
mathematician; he means by ‘mathematics’ the mathematics
which he can understand, and which I have called ‘school’
mathematics. This mathematics has many uses, which I have
admitted, which we can call ‘social’ if we please, and which
Hogben enforces with many interesting appeals to the history of
mathematical discovery. It is this which gives his book its merit,
since it enables him to make plain, to many readers who never
have been and never will be mathematicians, that there is more in
mathematics than they though. But he has hardly any understanding
of ‘real’ mathematics (as any one who reads what he says
about Pythagoras’s theorem, or about Euclid and Einstein, can tell
at one), and still less sympathy with it (as he spares no pains to
show). ‘Real’ mathematics is to him merely an object of
contemptuous pity.

It is not lack of understanding or of sympathy which is the
trouble in Whitehead’s cases; but he forgets, is his enthusiasm,
distinctions with which he is quite familiar. The mathematics
which has this ‘tremendous effect’ on the ‘daily avocations of
men’ and on ‘the organization of society’ is not the Whitehead
but the Hogben mathematics. The mathematics which can be used
‘for ordinary purposes by ordinary men’ is negligible, and that
which can be used by economists or sociologist hardly rises to
‘scholarship standard’. The Whitehead mathematics may affect
astronomy or physics profoundly, philosophy only appreciably—
high thinking of one kind is always likely to affect high thinking
of another—but it has extremely little effect on anything else. Its
‘tremendous effects’ have been, not on men generally, but on
men like Whitehead.

There are then two mathematics. There is the real mathematics of
the real mathematicians, and there is what I call the ‘trivial’
mathematics, for want of a better word. The trivial mathematics
may be justified by arguments which would appeal to Hogben, or
other writers of his school, but there is no such defence for the
real mathematics, which must be justified as arts if it can be
justified at all. There is nothing in the least paradoxical or
unusual in this view, which is that held commonly by mathematicians.

We have still one more question to consider. We have concluded
that the trivial mathematics is, on the whole, useful, and
that the real mathematics, on the whole, is not; that the trivial
mathematics does, and the real mathematics does not, ‘do good’
in a certain sense; but we have still to ask whether either sort of
mathematics does harm. It would be paradoxical to suggest that
mathematics of any sort does much harm in time of peace, so that
we are driven to the consideration of the effects of mathematics

on war. It is every difficult to argue such questions at all
dispassionately now, and I should have preferred to avoid them;
but some sort of discussion seems inevitable. Fortunately, it need
not be a long one.

There is one comforting conclusions which is easy for a real
mathematician. Real mathematics has no effects on war. No one
has yet discovered any warlike purpose to be served by the theory
of numbers or relativity, and it seems very unlikely that anyone
will do so for many years. It is true that there are branches of
applied mathematics, such as ballistics and aerodynamics, which
have been developed deliberately for war and demand a quite
elaborate technique: it is perhaps hard to call them ‘trivial’, but
none of them has any claim to rank as ‘real’. They are indeed
repulsively ugly and intolerably dull; even Littlewood could not
make ballistics respectable, and if he could not who can? So a
real mathematician has his conscience clear; there is nothing to be
set against any value his work may have; mathematics is, as I said
at Oxford, a ‘harmless and innocent’ occupation.

The trivial mathematics, on the other hand, has many applications
in war. The gunnery experts and aeroplane designers, for
example, could not do their work without it. And the general
effect of these applications is plain: mathematics facilitates (if not
so obviously as physics or chemistry) modern, scientific, ‘total’
war.

It is not so clear as it might seem that this is to be regretted,
since there are two sharply contrasted views about modern
scientific war. The first and the most obvious is that the effect of
science on war is merely to magnify its horror, both by increasing
the sufferings of the minority who have to fight and by extending
them to other classes. This is the most natural and orthodox view.
But there is a very different view which seems also quite tenable,
and which has been stated with great force by Haldane in
Callinicus18. It can be maintained that modern warfare is less

18 J. B. S. Haldane, Callinicus: a Defence of Chemical Warfare (1924).

horrible than the warfare of pre-scientific times; that bombs are
probably more merciful than bayonets; that lachrymatory gas and
mustard gas are perhaps the most humane weapons yet devised
by military science; and that the orthodox view rests solely on
loos-thinking sentimentalism19. It may also by urged (though this
was not one of Haldane’s theses) that the equalization of risks
which science was expected to bring would be in the long range
salutary; that a civilian’s life is not worth more than a soldier’s,
nor a woman’s more than a man’s; that anything is better than the
concentration of savagery on one particular class; and that, in
short, the sooner war comes ‘all out’ the better.

I do not know which of these views is nearer to the truth. It is
an urgent and a moving question, but I need not argue it here. It
concerns only the ‘trivial’ mathematics, which it would be
Hogben’s business to defend rather than mine. The cases for his
mathematics may be rather more than a little soiled; the case for
mine is unaffected.

Indeed, there is more to be said, since there is one purpose at
any rate which the real mathematics may serve in war. When the
world is mad, a mathematician may find in mathematics an
incomparable anodyne. For mathematics is, of all the arts and
sciences, the most austere and the most remote, and a mathematician
should be of all men the one who can most easily take refuge
where, as Bertrand Russell says, ‘one at least of our nobler
impulses can best escape from the dreary exile of the actual
world. It is a pity that it should be necessary to make one very
serious reservation—he must not be too old. Mathematics is not a
contemplative but a creative subject; no one can draw much
consolation from it when he has lost the power or the desire to
create; and that is apt to happen to a mathematician rather soon. It

19 I do not wish to prejudge the question by this much misused word; it may be used quite
legitimately to indicate certain type of unbalanced emotion. Many people, of course, use
‘sentimentalism’ as a term of abuse for other people’s decent feelings, and ‘realism’ as a
disguise for their own brutality.

is a pity, but in that case he does not matter a great deal anyhow,
and it would be silly to bother about him.

I will end with a summary of my conclusions, but putting them in
a more personal way. I said at the beginning that anyone who
defends his subject will find that he is defending himself; and my
justification of the life of a professional mathematician is bound
to be, at bottom, a justification of my own. Thus this concluding
section will be in its substance a fragment of autobiography.

I cannot remember ever having wanted to be anything but a
mathematician. I suppose that it was always clear that my specific
abilities lay that way, and it never occurred to me to question the
verdict of my elders. I do not remember having felt, as a boy, any
passion for mathematics, and such notions as I may have had of
the career of a mathematician were far from noble. I thought of
mathematics in terms of examinations and scholarships: I wanted
to beat other boys, and this seemed to be the way in which I could
do so most decisively.

I was about fifteen when (in a rather odd way) my ambitions
took a sharper turn. There is a book by ‘Alan St Aubyn’20 called
A Fellow of Trinity, one of a series dealing with what is supposed
to be Cambridge college life. I suppose that it is a worse book
than most of Marie Corelli’s; but a book can hardly be entirely
bad if it fires a clever boy’s imagination. There are two heroes, a
primary hero called Flowers, who is almost wholly good, and a
secondary hero, a much weaker vessel, called Brown. Flowers
and Brown find many dangers in university life, but the worst is a
gambling saloon in Chesterton21 run by the Misses Bellenden,
two fascinating but extremely wicked young ladies. Flowers
survives all these troubles, is Second Wrangler and Senior

20 ‘Alan St Aubyn’ was Mrs Frances Marshall, wife of Matthew Marshall.
21 Actually, Chesterton lacks picturesque features.

Classic, and succeeds automatically to a Fellowship (as I suppose
he would have done then). Brown succumbs, ruins his parents,
takes to drink, is saved from delirium tremens during a thunderstorm
only by the prayers of the Junior Dean, has much difficult
in obtaining even an Ordinary Degree, and ultimately becomes a
missionary. The friendship is not shattered by these unhappy
events, and Flowers’s thought stray to Brown, with affectionate
pity, as he drinks port and eats walnuts for the first time in Senior
Combination Room.

Now Flowers was a decent enough fellow (so far as ‘Alan St
Aubyn’ could draw one), but even my unsophisticated mind
refused to accept him as clever. If he could do these things, why
not I? In particular, the final scene in Combination Room
fascinated me completely, and from that time, until I obtained
one, mathematics meant to me primarily a Fellowship at Trinity.

I found at once, when I came to Cambridge, that a Fellowship
implied ‘original work’, but it was a long time before I formed
any definite idea of research. I had of course found at school, as
every future mathematician odes, that I could often do things
much better than my teachers; and even at Cambridge, I found,
though naturally much less frequently, that I could sometimes do
things better than the College lecturers. But I was really quite
ignorant, even when I took the Tripos, of the subjects on which I
have spent the rest of my life; and I still thought of mathematics
as essentially a ‘competitive’ subject. My eyes were first opened
by Professor Love, who taught me for a few terms and gave me
my first serious conception of analysis. But the great debt which I
owe to him—he was, after all, primarily an applied mathematician—
was his advice to read Jordan’s famous Cours d’anlyse;
and I shall never forget the astonishment with which I read that
remarkable work, the first inspiration for so many mathematicians
of my generation, and learnt for the first time as I read it what
mathematics really meant. From that time onwards, I was in my

way a real mathematician, with sound mathematical ambitions
and a genuine passion for mathematics.

I wrote a great deal during the next ten years, but very little of
any importance; there are not more than four or five papers which
I can still remember with some satisfaction. The real crisis of my
career came ten or twelve years later, in 1911, when I began my
long collaboration with Littlewood, and in 1913, when I
discovered Ramanujan. All my best work since then has been
bound up with theirs, and it is obvious that my association with
them was the decisive event of my life. I still say to myself when
I am depressed, and find myself forced to listen to pompous and
tiresome people, ‘Well, I have done one the thing you could never
have done, and that is to have collaborated with both Littlewood
and Ramanujan on something like equal terms.’ It is to them that
I owe an unusually late maturity: I was at my best a little past
forty, when I was a professor at Oxford. Since then I have
suffered from that steady deterioration which is the common fate
of elderly men and particularly of elderly mathematicians. A
mathematician may still be competent enough at sixty, but if it is
useless to expect him to have original ideas.

It is plain now that my life, for what it is worth, is finished, and
that nothing I can do can perceptibly increase or diminish its
value. It is very difficult to be dispassionate, but I count it a
‘success’; I have had more reward and not less than was due to a
man of my particular grade of ability. I have held a series of
comfortable and ‘dignified’ positions. I have had very little
trouble with the duller routine of universities. I hate ‘teaching’,
and have had to do very little, such teaching as I have done been
almost entirely supervision of research; I love lecturing, and have
lectured a great deal to extremely able classes; and I have always
had plenty of leisure for the researches which have been the one
great permanent happiness of my life. I have found it easy to
work with others, and have collaborated on a large scale with two
exceptional mathematicians; and this has enable me to add to

mathematics a good deal more than I could reasonable have
expected. I have had my disappointments, like any other
mathematician, but none of them has been too serious or has
made me particularly unhappy. If I had been offered a life neither
better nor worse when I was twenty, I would have accepted
without hesitation.

It seems absurd to suppose that I could have ‘done better’. I
have no linguistic or artistic ability, and very little interest in
experimental science. I might have been a tolerable philosopher,
but not one of a very original kind. I think that I might have made
a good lawyer; but journalism is the only profession, outside
academic life, in which I should have felt really confident of my
changes. There is no doubt that I was right to be a mathematician,
if the criterion is to be what is commonly called success.

My choice was right, then, if what I wanted was a reasonable
comfortable and happy life. But solicitors and stockbrokers and
bookmakers often lead comfortable and happy lives, and it is very
difficult to see how the world is richer for their existence. Is there
any sense in which I can claim that my life has been less futile
than theirs? It seems to me again that there is only one possible
answer: yes, perhaps, but, if so, for one reason only:

I have never done anything ‘useful’. No discovery of mine has
made, or is likely to make, directly or indirectly, for good or ill,
the least difference to the amenity of the world. I have helped to
train other mathematicians, but mathematicians of the same kind
as myself, and their work has been, so far at any rate as I have
helped them to it, as useless as my own. Judged by all practical
standards, the value of my mathematical life is nil; and outside
mathematics it is trivial anyhow. I have just one chance of
escaping a verdict of complete triviality, that I may be judged to
have created something worth creating. And that I have created is
undeniable: the question is about its value.

The case for my life, then, or for that of any one else who has
been a mathematician in the same sense which I have been one, is

this: that I have added something to knowledge, and helped others
to add more; and that these somethings have a value which differs
in degree only, and not in kind, from that of the creations of the
great mathematicians, or of any of the other artists, great or small,
who have left some kind of memorial behind them.

Note

Professor Broad and Dr Snow have both remarked to me that, if I
am to strike a fair balance between the good and evil done by
science, I must not allow myself to be too obsessed by its effects
on war; and that, even when I am thinking of them, I must
remember that it has many very important effects besides those
which are purely destructive. Thus (to take the latter point first), I
must remember (a) that the organization of an entire population
for war is only possible through scientific methods; (b) that
science has greatly increased the power of propaganda, which is
used almost exclusively for evil; and (c) that it has made
‘neutrality’ almost impossible or unmeaning, so that there are no
longer ‘islands of peace’ from which sanity and restoration might
spread out gradually after war. All this, of course, tends to
reinforce the case against science. On the other hand, even if we
press this case to the utmost, it is hardly possible to maintain
seriously that the evil done by science is not altogether outweighed
by the good. For example, if ten million lives were lost
in every war, the net effect of science would still have been to
increase the average length of life. In short, my §28 is much too
‘sentimental’.

I do not dispute the justice of these criticisms, but, for the
reasons which I state in my preface, I have found it impossible to
meet them in my text, and content myself with this acknowledgement.

Dr Snow had also made an interesting point about §8. Even if
we grant that ‘Archimedes will be remembered when Aeschylus
is forgotten’, is not mathematical fame a little too ‘anonymous’ to
be wholly satisfying? We could form a fairly coherent picture of
the personality of Aeschylus (still more, of course, of Shakespeare
or Tolstoi) from their works alone, while Archimedes and
Eudoxus would remain mere names.

Mr J. M. Lomas put this point more picturesquely when we
were passing the Nelson column in Trafalgar square. If I had a
statue on a column in London, would I prefer the columns to be
so high that the statue was invisible, or low enough for the
features to be recognizable? I would choose the first alternative,
Dr Snow, presumably, the second.

posted @ 2011-04-17 11:36 babykick 阅读(1263) 评论(0) 编辑收藏举报

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