SIMLock锁卡功能解析
一、锁卡背景介绍
锁卡即SIMLock,当手机开机启动或者插入SIM卡时,手机modem侧预置在NV项中的配置信息会与SIM卡中的信息做比对,检测是否匹配。若匹配,则SIM卡可以正常使用。若不匹配,则SIM卡相关功能均无法正常使用,例如拨打电话、发送短信及上网等;或者是只能注册2G网,不能注册4G。
锁卡的目的:一些运营商会要求控制某一类卡的使用,从而保护自己的利益(运营商定制机)
SIMLock锁和图案锁,数字密码锁,PIN码锁,PUK锁一样,是Keyguard模块中的一种锁。
二、锁卡的需求
锁卡的需求方式有7种之多,常见的有NP锁,NS锁,CP锁,SP锁等
从安卓机器来看,目前最常用的是SP锁(MCC/MNC),本文将解析SP锁的加锁流程
三、锁卡流程解析
1.首先modem侧检测SIM卡的配置信息并与之作比对,若匹配则继续加载SIM卡,若不匹配,则上报加锁信息
2.RIL层检测到modem上报的加锁信息,然后发送给framework层,最终在AP层监测到事件:
3.AP层显示出锁卡界面,要求用户输入解锁码进行解锁
四、相关流程图
1.加锁流程图
2.解锁流程图
五、代码解析
MTK平台已经支持SIMLock功能,但只能在代码中写固定的MCC/MNC,不能灵活配置。即一套代码只能对应一套对应的锁卡配置信息,对于手机厂商来说,显然不满足需求,发货国家遍布全球,锁卡配置信息均不同,代码版本太多无法管理,故肯定要废弃MTK的这套SIMLock功能。
(1)modem侧客制化
涉及的代码文件:
custom/modem/common/ps/custom_nvram_extra.c custom/modem/common/ps/customer_at_command.c custom/service/nvram/custom_nvram_sec.c custom/service/nvram/custom_nvram_sec.h interface/service/nvram/nvram_data_items.h service/nvram/src/nvram_factory_config.c service/nvram/src/nvram_main.c
a.扩展锁卡配置信息的组数
custom_nvram_sec.h
#define SML_MAX_SUPPORT_CAT_N 50
初始化数组的时候,需要添加对应的默认配置信息
const nvram_sml_context_struct NVRAM_EF_SML_DEFAULT = { SML_MAGIC_HEAD_VALUE, {{SML_STATE_UNLOCK,SML_RETRY_COUNT_N_CAT,0,0}, /* Category N */ {SML_STATE_UNLOCK,SML_RETRY_COUNT_NS_CAT ,0,0}, /* Category NS */ {SML_STATE_UNLOCK,SML_RETRY_COUNT_SP_CAT ,0,0}, /* Category SP */ {SML_STATE_UNLOCK,SML_RETRY_COUNT_C_CAT ,0,0}, /* Category C */ {SML_STATE_UNLOCK,SML_RETRY_COUNT_SIM_CAT ,0,0}, /* Category SIM */ {SML_STATE_UNLOCK,SML_RETRY_COUNT_NS_CAT ,0,0}, /* Link NS-SP */ {SML_STATE_UNLOCK,SML_RETRY_COUNT_C_CAT ,0,0}}, /* Link SIM-C */ {{SML_KEY_SET,{0x21,0x43,0x65,0x87,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}, {SML_KEY_SET,{0x65,0x87,0x21,0x43,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}, {SML_KEY_SET,{0x11,0x22,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}, {SML_KEY_EMPTY,{0x33,0x44,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}, {SML_KEY_EMPTY,{0x55,0x66,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}, {SML_KEY_SET,{0x77,0x88,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}, {SML_KEY_SET,{0x99,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF}}}, /* Category N code */ {0x73,0x00,0x1F,0x73,0x00,0x2F,0x73,0x00,0x3F,0x73,0x00,0x4F,0x73,0x00,0x5F, 0x73,0x00,0x6F,0x73,0x00,0x7F,0x73,0x00,0x8F,0x73,0x00,0x9F,0x73,0x01,0x0F, 0x73,0x01,0x1F,0x73,0x09,0x9F,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00}, /* Category NS code */ {0xc2,0xc2,0xc2,0xc2,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, /* Category SP code */ {0xc3,0xc3,0xc3,0xc3,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, /* Category C code */ {0xc4,0xc4,0xc4,0xc4,0xc4,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, /* Category SIM code */ {0xc5,0xc5,0xc5,0xc5,0xc5,0xc5,0xc5,0xc5,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, /* Link Category NS-SP */ {0xc6,0xc6,0xc6,0xc6,0xc6,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, /* Link Category SIM-C */ {0xc7,0xc7,0xc7,0xc7,0xc7,0xc7,0xc7,0xc7,0xc7,0xc7, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF, 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, {0xFF,0xFF}, SML_MAGIC_TAIL_VALUE };
b.修改剩余解锁次数
custom_nvram_sec.h
#define SML_MAX_RETRY_COUNT 10
c.扩展客制化的锁卡NV项
例如MTK源生的锁卡NV项已经可以通过工具查看及修改,这样锁卡就容易被破解。客制化自己的锁卡NV项,即使MTK源生的被破解了,SIMLock功能依旧正常工作。
不过从Android 6.0来看,MTK已经在modem侧做了处理,使用工具无法查看及修改该NV项了。
(1)先定义NV项
(2)对该NV项进行对应的初始化,参考源生的即可
d.扩展锁卡的特殊需求(关联锁卡等)
由于源生的AT指令不能查询锁卡状态信息,可以通过扩展AT指令来实现
如下代码为扩展的AT+QSIM1的指令,查询的信息包括锁卡状态,锁卡配置信息,剩余次数等
if (strcmp(cmd_name, "QSIM1") == 0) { extern void simlock_query_sml_info(kal_uint8 sim_id, sml_context_struct* sml_static_buffer); char info_buffer[MAX_UART_LEN+1]; int NumOfPlmn,i; int isLocked = -1; sml_context_struct sml_static_buffer; memset(&sml_static_buffer,0x00,sizeof(sml_context_struct)); simlock_query_sml_info(1, &sml_static_buffer); kal_prompt_trace(MOD_SIM, "[sim1]: receive full_cmd_string =%s", full_cmd_string); sml_cat_enum cat = 0xff; for(cat = SML_CAT_N; cat < SML_CAT_SIZE; cat++) { if(sml_static_buffer.cat[cat].state == 0x01) { isLocked = 1; break; } } if(isLocked == 1) { NumOfPlmn = sml_static_buffer.cat[cat].num; NumOfPlmn = 1; sprintf(info_buffer, "+QSIM1:%02x;",sml_static_buffer.cat[cat].state); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x;",NumOfPlmn); //#define SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_N 3 /* MCC/MNC */ //#define SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_NS 4 /* MCC/MNC + HLR */ //#define SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_SP 4 /* MCC/MNC + GID1 */ //#define SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_C 5 /* MCC/MNC + GID1 + GID2 */ //#define SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_SIM 8 /* IMSI */ //#define SML_SIZE_OF_LINK_NS_SP 5 /* MCC/MNC + HLR+ GID1 */ //#define SML_SIZE_OF_LINK_SIM_C 10 /* IMSI + GID1 + GID2 */ if(cat == SML_CAT_N) { for(i = 0; i < NumOfPlmn*SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_N; i=i+SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_N) { sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x;",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_n[i], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_n[i + 1],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_n[i + 2]); } //sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x",sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[4], // sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[5],sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[6],sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[7]); //kal_prompt_trace(MOD_SIM, " receive cmd =%s ; flag is %x ", cmd_name, read_buffer); } else if(cat == SML_CAT_NS) { for(i = 0; i < NumOfPlmn*SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_NS; i=i+SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_NS) { sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x;",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns[i], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns[i + 1],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns[i + 2],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns[i + 3]); } } else if(cat == SML_CAT_SP) { for(i = 0; i < NumOfPlmn*SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_SP; i=i+SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_SP) { sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x;",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sp[i], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sp[i + 1],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sp[i + 2],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sp[i + 3]); } } else if(cat == SML_CAT_C) { for(i = 0; i < NumOfPlmn*SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_C; i=i+SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_C) { sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_c[i], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_c[i + 1],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_c[i + 2],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_c[i + 3]); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x;",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_c[i + 4]); } } else if(cat == SML_CAT_SIM) { for(i = 0; i < NumOfPlmn*SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_SIM; i=i+SML_SIZE_OF_CAT_SIM) { sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i + 1],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i + 2],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i + 3]); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x;",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i + 4], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i + 5],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i + 6], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim[i + 7]); } } else if(cat == SML_CAT_NS_SP) { for(i = 0; i < NumOfPlmn*SML_SIZE_OF_LINK_NS_SP; i=i+SML_SIZE_OF_LINK_NS_SP) { sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns_sp[i], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns_sp[i + 1],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns_sp[i + 2],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns_sp[i + 3]); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x;",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_ns_sp[i + 4]); } } else if(cat == SML_CAT_SIM_C) { for(i = 0; i < NumOfPlmn*SML_SIZE_OF_LINK_SIM_C; i=i+SML_SIZE_OF_LINK_SIM_C) { sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 1],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 2], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 3]); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 4], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 5],sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 6], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 7]); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x;",sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 8], sml_static_buffer.code_cat_sim_c[i + 9]); } } sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x",sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[0], sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[1],sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[2],sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[3]); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x%02x%02x%02x;",sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[4], sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[5],sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[6],sml_static_buffer.key[cat].key[7]); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x;",sml_static_buffer.cat[cat].retry_count); sprintf(info_buffer+strlen(info_buffer), "%02x;",cat); } else { sprintf(info_buffer, "+QSIM1:%02x;",0x00); } //kal_prompt_trace(MOD_NVRAM, "[sim1]: info_buffer is === >> %s", info_buffer); rmmi_write_to_uart((kal_uint8*)info_buffer, strlen(info_buffer), KAL_FALSE); sprintf(buffer, "OK"); rmmi_write_to_uart((kal_uint8*)buffer, strlen(buffer), KAL_TRUE); return KAL_TRUE; }
(2)AP侧客制化
SIMLock客制化工作量主要集中在modem侧,AP侧主要为界面显示及AT指令的交互
a.AT指令的交互
查询SIM卡状态
查询锁卡状态信息:是否锁卡,锁卡的配置信息(MCC/MNC),解锁剩余次数等
发送PASSWORD到RIL侧,解析解锁是否成功的返回信息
b.用户界面的显示
提示用户输入解锁码
提示剩余解锁次数
提示剩余时间可以继续输入解锁码
提示SIM卡永久被锁